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1. INTRODUCTION
During the twentieth century, public legal concern about the
environment has evolved, in broad and overlapping strokes, from
assorted local governmental responses to national norms, to
regional treaties between a few sovereign nation-states, to
multilateral and even global conventions, charters, declarations,
conferences, and agendas.1 During this same time frame, private
legal concern about the environment, at least at the domestic level
in a few developed nation-states, has begun to slowly shift from
a largely defensive, tort law liability-avoidance orientation to a
more proactive, negotiated, contractual approach of voluntarily-
assumed responsibility.2 As we prepare to move into the twenty-
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S., 1973,
University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School); J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School.
I For a useful and succinct historical background on the emergence of the
field of international environmental law, see ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] ("International environmental law,
the newest branch of international law, comprises those international juridical
norms whose purpose is to protect the environment.... [It] originated in a
growing awarenes; that our planet is endangered by the continued-multiplica-
tion of human population, by increasingly invasive technology, and by the
disordered activities of humanity."). See generally id. at xiii-xxix (providing a
chronological table of international environmental agreements entered into
during the twentieth century).
2 The evolution of environmental law and policy in the United States is
instructive. Seminal American environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671q (1996), and the Clean Water Act, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1996) were premised on common law
nuisance principles. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 555, 558-60 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER (1986)). Private interests, from
corporate polluters to citizen activists, tended to focus on the broad question
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first century and the third millennium of our era,3 it is apparent
that, in contrast to the rich and varied literature addressing the
direct public management of international environmental risk,4
of whether or not a polluter was liable, based on broad notions of fault and
causation, for discrete environmental harms, and the appropriate remedy for
ameliorating the harm. See id.; see also Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ACT (CERCLA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 9601-
9675 (1996) (incorporating a strict liability tort-based statutory scheme).
Startingin earnest during the 1970s, some innovative American manufac-
turers like the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M Company)
led the way in beginning the process of shifting their f6cus from pollution-
control/liability-avoidance approaches to pollution prevention/contractual-like
commitments to avoid harmful pollution from occurring in the first place. See
generally Robert F. Blomcuist, Government's Role Regarding Industrial Pollution
Prevention in the Unite States, 29 GA. LAW REV. 349 (1995) (discussing
pollution prevention law and policy developments in the United States during
the last two decades).
' Viewing any cultural phenomenon from a millennial perspective, whether
it be law or fashion, technology or art, economics or religion, induces a sense
of deep humility. As poignantly expressed by Oxford University Professor
Felipe Fernandez-Armesto:
I have a vision of some galactic museum of the distant future in which
Diet Coke cans will share with coats of chain mail a single small
vitrine marked 'Planet Earth, 1000-2000, Christian Era.' The last
decade of our millennium may be under-represented, because so much
of our significant trash will have biodegraded into oblivion; but
material from every period in every part of the world, over the last
thousand years, will be seen by visitors as evidence of the same quaint,
remote culture: totem poles and Tompion clocks, Netsuke ivories and
Nayarit clays, bankers' plastic and Benin bronzes. The distinctions
apparent to us, as we look back on the history of our thousand years
from just inside it, will be obliterated by the perspective of long-time
and vast distance. Chronology will fuse like crystls in a crucible, and
our assumptions about the relative importance of events will be
clouded or clarified by a terrible length of hindsight.
FELIPE FERNA'NDEZ-ARMESTO, MILLENNIUM: A HISTORY OF THE LAST
THOUSAND YEARS 11 (1995). While it is tempting to speculate on the nature
of the international (intergalactic?) environmental space?) order over the next
thousand years, from 2000 A.D. to 3000 A.D., I will defer that urge at this time
and leave that task to science fiction writers.
4 A working bibliography of some key American law review articles which
discuss, in relatively general terms, direct command and control public
management of international environmental risk include the following:
Ambassador Richard E. Benedick, The Montreal Ozone Treaty: Implications for
Global Warming, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1990); David P. Bryden,
Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1978);
John A. Busterud, International Environmental Relations, 7 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 325 (1974); W.J. Coppoc, The Environment: No Respecter of National
Boundaries, 43 ALB. L. REV. 520 (1979); Richard A. Falk, The Global Envi-
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little serious normative attention is being given to the structure
and characteristics of a system of indirect public encouragement
that would effectively promote private initiatives to mitigate the
international problem of environmental risk that crosses national
boundaries.
The purpose of this Article is to consider some models and
metaphors that will encourage private efforts to manage one type
of international environmental risk better: transboundary toxic
substances risk. Initially, I will describe the nature of the problem
of international toxic substances pollution as a "transsectoral
environmental problematique" which requires incentive-based
policy interventions in order to promote private solutions to a
very public problem.5 Secondly, I will consider a number of
indirect, incentive-based policy models (tradeable emissions to
pollution charges; subsidies to challenge regulations; and informa-
tion reporting to technical assistance). Moreover, as a component
of this analysis, the Article will review various institutional
metaphors (global intergovernmental organizations to global non-
governmental organizations and regional organizations to federal
political systems) that might be employed to better encourage
ronment and International Law: Challenge and Response, 23 KAN. L. REV. 385
(1975); Lothar Giindling, Our Responsibility to Future Generations, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 207 (1990); Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Interna-
tionalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1989 ; Ann
Hunkeler, International Environmental Issues: A Selected Annotated Bibliogra-
phy, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (1981); Douglas M. Johnston, Systematic
Environmental Damage: The Challenge to International Law and Organization,
12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255 (1985); Oleg S. Kolbasov, Modern
Ecological Policy and the Utilization of a Global Environmental Protection Strate-
gy, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (1988); Blanka Kudej, International Environ-
mental Law: Selective Bibliography, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 825 (1988);
Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind
Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983); Myres
S. McDougal & Jan Schneider, The Protection of the Environment and World
Public Order: Some Recent Developments, 45 MISS. L.J. 1085 (1974); Ved P.
Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to
International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291 (1976); Carol
Annette Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 351 (1990); Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community
and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1989); Louis B. Sohn, The
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L Lj. 423
(1973); David S. Zalob, Approaches to Enforcement of Environmental Law: An
International Perspective, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 299 (1980).
5 See infra notes 8-101 and accompanying text.
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responsible private environmental stewardship of transboundary
toxic substances pollution risk.6 Finally, I conclude with a
suggested set of principles for a theory of international incentive-
based environmental experimentation that has the potential for
reducing transboundary toxic substances risk.'
2. Toxic SUBSTANCES AND THE TRANSSECTORAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMATIQUE
2.1. Factual Contours
2.1.1. The Nature of Toxic Substances
A toxic substance may be defined as any material, chemical, or
chemical mixture, whether useful or intended to be discarded,
which may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment. Potential injuries posed by such substances range
from death, at one extreme, to disease and birth defects at the
other. "Toxicity," then, is a biological measure of harmfulness!
The key related parameters include: the dose of the substance in
question;9 the exposure route of the substances; the response
6 See infra notes 102-217 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 218-39 and accompanying text.
I The meaning of "toxic substances" is ambiguous. For example, one
recent publication, OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER'S GUIDE 375 (1997) [hereinafter USER'S
GUIDE] includes seven substantive toxic-related definitions, including toxic
pollutants, toxic substances, and toxic waste, among others. "Toxicity," is thus
related to "hazardousness." As apparent in the following definition of
"hazardous substance," derived from the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 6901-6992k (1996) (see generally 40
C.F.R. § 261 (1996)), a toxic substance is one potential type of hazardous
substance. A hazardous substance is "[a]ny material that poses a threat to
human health and/or the environment. Typical hazardous substances are toxic,
corrosive, ignitable, explosive, or chemically reactive." Id. at 364.
For other definitions of "toxic" or "toxicity," see, for example, Toxic
CHEMICALS, HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (Lester B. Lave & Arthur C.
Upton eds. 1987) [hereinafter ToxIcS AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (discussing the
danger due to the toxicity of different chemicals); Stanley M. Pier, et al.,
Recognition and Evaluation of Hazards, in ToxIc TORTS: LITIGATION OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES 2 (1984) [hereinafter Recognition of Hazards]
(defining toxicity as a chemical's capacity to produce injury or harm).
' Sources define the term "dose" in various ways. See, e.g., JOHN HARTE
ET AL., ToxicS A TO Z: A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY POLLUTION HAZARDS 15
(1991) [hereinafter TOxIcS A TO Z] ("A dose is usually expressed in one of
three ways: 1) the amount of the substance actually in the body, 2) the amount
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characteristics of a particular organism to a particular dosage; 10
and the overall risk presented by the substance."
Toxic substances may be classified in at least five ways: (1) the
relative toxicity of the substance;12 (2) the origins of the sub-
stance;1 3 (3) the form of the substance; 14 (4) the chemical struc-
of the material entering the body (usually in food, drinking water, or the air
you breathe) or 3) the concentration in the environment."); Recognition of
Hazards, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that a dose considers both the
concentration or quantity of a chemical and the duration of exposure to it);
ToxIcs AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 8, at 115 (defining a dose as the
"amount of chemical deposited on or translocated to a site on or within the
body where toxic effects take place").
10 Sources vary in their definition of the term "response." See, e.., ToxICS
A TO Z, supra note 9, at 16, 446 ("[T]he statement of the health damage (or
response) resulting from a specified dose can be couched in many different
forms because there are so many different dimensions to human health and its
degradation"); Recognition of Hazards, supra note 8, at 9 ("[T]he dose-effect or
dose-response relationship is an essential element in determining those exposures
that would be considered safe and those which represent potentially hazardous
conditions."); see also TOXICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 8, 170-71,
which states:
The paradigms of toxicology are straightforward: (1) Each individual
chemical or physical agent has a toxicity syndrome associated with
exposure to that agent. (2) The response to the agent follows a general
dose-response relationship (response increasing with dose. And-(3) the
response in laboratory animals predicts the response in humans. The
assumptions underlying the interpretation of the dose-response
relationship are that a receptor or receptors have been occupied and
that the occupation of these receptors results in a toxic response....
The greater the percentage of the receptors occupied, the greater the
response, until a maximum level of response is achieved.
" A sample definition of "risk" is that "[r]isk [is] a complex evaluation of
both the amount of potential damage and the probability of the damage
actually occurring." TOxICs A TO Z, supra note 9, at 446; see also TOXICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 8, at 24 (discussing the concept of risk).
1 In this regard, most scientists contend that a 50 percent lethal dose (LD
50), or the dosage that will cause death of 50 percent of the sample of tested
animals, is "the most useful way to estimate toxicity." Poisons aid Poisoning,
25 ENCY. BRIT. 895, 895 (1990).
Use of lethal dosage, however, is not feasible with regard to direct
measurement of toxic impacts on human beings. In this regard, one commonly
used toxicity rating system demarcates toxicity classes on the basis of
commonly-encountered criteria such as "taste," "a mouthful," or "an ounce.
"Substances so poisonous that a taste (less than seven drops) probably would
kill a man are rated 6, 'supertoxic'. At the other end of the scale are found
substances in class 1, 'practically nontoxic', with probably lethal doses of a
quart or more." Id. at 896.
13 Regarding origins of toxic substances, "(a) toxins of plant and animal
origin are of special interest to veterinary toxicologists, medicinal herbalists,
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
ture of the substance;"5 and (5) the potential health risks associat-
ed with the substance.
16
2.1.2. Shifting Concern from Conventional Pollutants to
Toxic Pollutants
Modern national environmental policies had their genesis in
basic pollution control laws passed by various developed countries
during the 1960s and 1970s. Engendered by both political and
intellectual ferment, particularly in the United States,17 modern
chemists, metabolic biochemists, and nutritionists; (b) industrial chemicals and
minerals are of concern to occupational physicians and industrial hygienists;
and (c) drugs are the focus of pharmacologists and clinical toxicologists." Id.
14 A form-based toxicological approach differentiates between the following
substances: "(a) radiation: radioactive nuclides (e.g., radioactive iodine); (b)
gases: carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulfide, war gases; (c) liquids: solvents; (d)
solids: asbestos, metals." id.
15 Different chemical structures, or variations in chemical nature, of poisons
include the following: "(a) acids: oxalic; (b) alkalies: lye, ammonia; (c) alcohols:
ethyl, methyl; (d) amines: aniline; (e) heavy metals: mercury, lead, cadmium;
W9 hydrocartons: kerosene, benzene; (g chlorinated hydrocarbons: dichlo-
rodiphenyl-trichloroethane DDT), dielirin, carbon tetrachloride, polychlor-
inated biphenyls; (h) organic phosphates: parathion, malathion, and others."
Id.
16 See "Dear Colleague" letter of U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (1992). The ATSDR announced the development of "a list of seven
priority health conditions (PHCs)" to provide guidance in pursuing the Agen-
cy's mission. The seven PHCs identified by the Agency included the following
(in alphabetical order):
Birth defects and reproductive disorders
Cancers (selected anatomic sites)
Immune function disorders
Kidney dysfunction
Liver dysfunction
Lung and respiratory diseases
Neurotoxic disorders
Id. However, carcinogenicity, the potential of a substance to cause any number
of human carcinomas, has typically been the chief concern of most people. For
a fascinating study dealing with cancer, toxic substances and regulatory policy,
see CARL E. CRANOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE AND THE LAW (1993) (providing chilling statistics about the cancer
risk in America and the cancer risk from toxic chemicals in particular).
"7 See generally Robert F. Blomquist, "Clean New World".• Toward an
Intellectual History of American Environmental Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Robert F. Blomquist, "To Stir Up Public Interest: Chairman
Edmund S. Muskie and the United States Senate Special Subcommittee's Water
Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities, 1963-66: A Case Study in Early
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environmental law and policy initially focused on typical or
conventional pollutants on a sector (or media) by sector basis.
This focus typically led to specific national environmental laws
dealing with air pollution in one statute, water pollution in
another statute, and solid and other conventional waste addressed
in another statute.1 8 Each statute was accompanied by a set of
implementing regulations. The term conventional pollutants
generally refers to substances that are being released in large
volumes, highly visible, and relatively easy to link to particular
health and environmental effects.19 Typical conventional air
pollutants include sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides; common
conventional water pollutants include dissolved solids, oil, and
grease.20
Commencing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however,
leading environmental policymakers changed their focus from
conventional pollutants to a second class: toxic pollutants. These
Congressional Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(1997).
18 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed.
1994) (detailing the approaches taken in the United States); see also SIMON BALL
& STUART BELL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING
TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1994) (noting the
approach taken in the United Kingdom); Wang Xi & Robert F. Blomquist, The
Developing Environmental Law and Policy of the People's Republic of China: An
Introduction and Appraisal, 5 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 25 (1992) (discussing
the approach taken in the People's Republic of China).
'9 See Robert Gottleib & Maureen Smith, The Pollution Control System:
Themes and Framework, in REDUCING ToxIcs: A NEW APPROACH TO
POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL DECISIONMAKING 19 (Robert Gottleib, ed. 1995)
[hereinafter REDUCING TOxICs]. As a shorthand, one can distinguish this class
of pollutants by the fact that they create "more 'obvious' (in the sense of acute
or short-term) problems, although they might also be associated with more
complex, subtle, and long-term effects. The conventional pollutants, and in
many cases their primary source categories, are comparatively few in number."
Id.
20 Conventional pollutants are usually "[s]tatutorily listed pollutants
understood well by scientists. These may be in the form of organic waste,
sediment, acid, bacteria, viruses, nutrients, oil and grease, or heat." USER'S
GUIDE, supra note 8, at 359. Technically speaking, however, it is customa
in American environmental law to view "conventional pollutants" as a special-
ized way of referring to common water pollutants. Common American air
pollutants have customarily been referred to, in a technical sense, as "criteria
pollutants" under the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act. "EPA has
identified and set standards to protect human health and welfare for six
[common air] pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, total suspended particulates,
sulfur dioxide, lead and nitrogen oxide." Id.
19971
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pollutants are
typified by carcinogens that are invisible and otherwise
more difficult to detect, and which may affect health and
cause environmental damage at trace concentrations or
very low exposure levels, although the degree of uncertain-
ty tends to be very high. While they may be associated
with short-term hazards, they are at least of equal concern
due to their persistence in the environment, and/or their
ability to cause serious disease after long latency periods.21
Three important systemic characteristics of industrial use of
toxic chemicals exist. First, the risks posed by toxic substances
occur at varying and disparate points of the life cycle of its use.'
Second, "distribution of exposure to risk varies markedly across
heterogeneous products and uses." 3 Third, in a general sense, a
considerable number of substitute products and processes to any
particular toxic substance exit.24
2.2. The Current International Legal Approach to Toxic
Substances Risk
Current international environmental law often utilizes cross-
21 REDUCING ToxIcs, supra note 19, at 19. There are thousands of
potentially toxic chemicals. Some chemicals have been more thoroughly
studied than others. See JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY:
CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK 5 (1988) (discussing a specialized study of
American regulatory policy concerning formaldehyde andbenzene, two toxic
pollutants).
22 See MOLLY K. MACAULEY ET AL., USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO
REGULATE TOxIC SUBSTANCES [hereinafter ECONOMIC INCENTIVES] 6 (1992)
("The potential for risks to health and the environment may occur at the mine
mouth or during production of the feedstock, during production of intermedi-
ate products that use the chemical as an input, during use by industry or
households, and upon disposal."); see also CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY (1993) (explaining
the laws governing an activity from the time resources are extracted, through
their manufacture, to the ultimate disposal of the wastes).
23 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 22, at 7. 'It is not always the case
that all products or uses of chemicals pose potential risks; nor is the nature of
the risk always the same ..... Id.
24 See id. "Regulatin a substance (or one of the products in which it
appears or uses to which it is put) is likely to include substitution of another
product or process." Id.
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cutting regulatory techniques and strategies such as "licensing,
lists, and standard-setting."" As it has developed during this
century, the law has tended to organize, regulate, and differentiate
between five discrete sector-based approaches to environmental
policy: air, soil, wildlife, oceans, and inland waters. 6 Within
the last twenty-five years, however, roughly coinciding with the
1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
("UNCHE"),V what may be termed the transsectoral environmen-
25 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 155. Initially,
"[licensing regimes act to prohibit certain activities unless a permit has been
accorded by the proper authorities. Permits [as exemplified by the London
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matters, 26 U.S.T. 2403, Dec. 29, 1972] can be general, concerning an
entire type of activity, or specific, required in precise cases." Id.
Secondly, the "use of lists avoids too much technical detail being included
in the basic norms [of international agreements] and also permits modification
of the listed substances without going through the often cumbersome
amendment process." Id. at 157.
The third generic technique of international environmental legal protection
is standard-setting. This technique can be subdivided into four categories of
standard-setting: (1) quality standards (which fix the maximum permissible
level of ambient pollution); (2) emission standards (which seek "to specify the
quantity of pollutants, or their concentration in discharges, which can be
emitted by a given source"); (3) process standards (specifying in considerable
detail the way various production processes must take place); and (4) product
standards (which "fix the physical or chemical composition of items such as
pharmaceuticals or detergents, or the handling, presentation and packaging of
products, particularly those which are toxic, or the levels of pollutants which
the product can emit during its use, such as automobile emission standards").
Id. at 158-59.
26 See generally id. at 155-305 (discussing frameworks, basic concepts,
historical evolution, specific sector-based norms, case studies, and illustrations
of international environmental sectoral approaches); WESLEY MARX, THE
OCEANS: OuR LAST RESOURCE (1981) (examining the history of thoughtless
abuse to which we have subjected the world's oceans; describing how many of
the effects of human past mistakes are only now coming to light; and exploring
a broad spectrum of alternatives for safeguarding the oceans).
27 See Patricia Birnie, The UN and the Environment, in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD 327,337-66 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed.
1993) (discussing the UNCHE and its impact on the subsequent growth of
international environmental law).
Six subjects were laced on UNCHE's agenda [in 1972]: planning
and management of human settlements for environmental quality;
environmental aspects of natural resource management; identification
and control of pollutants and nuisances of broad international
significance; educational, informational, social, and cultural aspects of
environmental issues; development and environment; international
organizational implications o action proposals. The aim was to adopt
1997]
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tal problematique has emerged as an intellectual construct for
resolving a few particularly vexing environmental concerns.
Regulations "aimed at integrated solutions are becoming more
common," and there is an aspiration towards "globalization or
holistic treatment of the environment."28 Indeed, transboundary
toxic substances are a paradigmatic case study of the transsectoral
environmental problematique. Since toxic substances can have an
"impact throughout the environment or pass from one sector to
another,"29 they often make single-sector approaches ineffective.
The current dominant international legal approach to toxic
substances risk, while weak and fragmented, is characterized by
multiple command and control regulatory approaches that tend to
overlap in certain respects and cluster around two transsectoral
policy problems: (1) toxic products and (2) toxic wastes.3"
2.2.1. Toxic Products
The international production and use of chemical products has
markedly increased during the past fifty years. Between 70,000
and 100,000 different varieties of chemical products are currently
a Declaration on the Human Environment.
Id. at 339.
The Stockholm Declaration was the culmination of the 1972 UNCHE.
"The Stockholm Declaration (a formalization used in the UN only when
principles of special importance are being proclaimed) laid down twenty-six
disparate principles, addressing developmental as well as environmental issues
.... " Id. at 348; see also EVOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS: FROM
STOCKHOLM TO NAIROBI (Mostafa Kamal Tolba ed., 1988) (reproducing the
text of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Nairobi Declaration of 1982,
along with statements of various nations attending these international environ-
mental conferences). Of particular interest with regard to toxic substances,
Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that: "The discharge of
toxic substances or other substances ... must be halted in order to ensure that
serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just
struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollution should be supported."
Id. at 5.
28 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 307.
29 Id.
3 See id. In addition to these policy problems, international environmental
law has evolved over the last decade to encompass other complex policy
problems that defy isolated sectoral regulatory approaches. Examples include
the problems of radioactivity, radioactive wastes, ozone depletion, and global
warming. See id. at 328-45.
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being sold in international commerce. 3' As noted by the drafters
of Agenda 21, an aspirational "soft law" blueprint approved by the
delegates to the June 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development ("UNCED") in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil:
32
[a]mong the... chemical substances in commerce and the
thousands of substances of natural origin with which
human beings come into contact, many appear as pollut-
ants and contaminants in food, commercial products and
the various environmental media. Fortunately, exposure
to most chemicals (some 1,500 cover over 95 per cent of
total world production) is rather limited, as most are used
in very small amounts.33
In a nutshell, the current international legal regime governing
toxic products risk is characterized by three distinctive features:
(1) few rules of broad and universal scope, (2) a discontinuous
approach with several policy gaps, and (3) little treaty-made law,
but rather existing rules established by disparate international
31 See id. at 308 (estimating between 70,000 to 80,000 chemical products in
world commerce); cf UNITED NATIONS, AGENDA 21: PROGRAMME OF
ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, [herinafter AGENDA 21] 19.11
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS
PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM RIO, U.N. Sales No. E.93.1.11 (1993) (esti-
mating 100,000 chemical products in use).
32 AGENDA 21 and THE Rio DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874, are major new examples of "soft law," based "on political agreement
rather than on legally binding instruments." Maurice Strong, Beyond Rio:
Prospects and Portents, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL. 21, 33 (1993).
Unlike "hard law," which comes mainly from custom or treaties, "soft law"
relies "on general statements of principle. Soft law instruments focus on
building consensus on a particular issue, while leaving more binding commit-
ments for subsequent agreements." Id. at 31, n.30; see also Geoffrey Palmer,
New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
269 (1992). "Although not legally binding," "soft law" instruments "provide a
basis for voluntary cooperation, which enables the action process to proceed
expeditiously and paves the way for negotiation of binding agreements."
Strong, supra, at 31-32.
33 AGENDA 21, supra note 31, 19.11.
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organizations.3 4 At present, the only general regulatory interna-
tional standards for toxic products consist of a set of recommen-
dations adopted by the International Programme on Chemical
Safety ("IPCS") in London in 1991 for "increased coordination
among United Nations bodies and other international organiza-
tions involved in chemical risk assessment and management,""
and recommendations by the World Health Organization
("WHO") issued in 1986 and approved by the Governing Council
of the United Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP").
The WHO recommendation addresses the worldwide production
of chemical substances and calls for more thorough and complete
health assessments. The WHO also calls for more effective risk-
based regulation of marketing and use of toxic products by means
of international agreements and cooperation among states.36
Agenda 21, however, proposes a somewhat redundant and
ambiguous internationally-coordinated six-part program37 consist-
ing of the following:
" "Expanding and accelerating international assessment of
chemical risks;"38
* "Harmonization of classification and labelling of
chemicals;"39
31 See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 309.
" AGENDA 21, supra note 31, 19.75.
36 See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 309.
37 See AGENDA 21, supra note 31, 19.4.
" Id. Specifically, the drafters of AGENDA 21 recommend that:
Governments, through the cooperation of relevant international
organizations and industry, where appropriate, should:
(a) Strengthen and expand programmes on chemical risk assessment
within the United Nations systems... ;
(b) Promote mechanisms to increase collaboration among Govern-
ments, industry, academia and relevant non-governmental organisations
involved in the various aspects of risk assessment of chemicals and
related processes, in particular the promoting and coordinating of
research activities to improve understanding of the mechanisms of
action of toxic chemicals;
(c) Encourage the development of procedures for the exchange by
countries of their assessment reports on chemicals with other countries
for use in national chemical assessment programmes [sic].
Id. 19.14.
39 Id. 19.4. Agenda 21 suggests that a joint public and private internation-
al harmonization project should commence.
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* "Information exchange on toxic chemicals and chemical
risks; " 4°
" "Establishment of risk reduction programmes [sic];" 41
Governments, through the cooperation of relevant international
organizations and industry, where appropriate, should launch a project
with a view to establishing and elaborating a harmonized classification
and compatible labelling system for chemicals in use in all United
Nations official languages including adequate pictograms. Such a
labelling system should not lead to the imposition of unjustified trade
barriers. The new system should draw on current systems to the
greatest extent possible; it should be developed in steps and should
address the subject of compatibility with labels of various applications.
Id. 19.28.
40 Id. 19.4. The drafters of Agenda 21 recommend a more coordinated
system of information exchange, suggesting that,
[g]overnments and relevant international organizations with the
cooperation of industry should:
(a) Strengthen national institutions responsible for information
exchange on toxic chemicals and promote the creation of national
centres where these centres do not exist;
(b) Strengthen international institutions and networks, such as IRPTC
[the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals], responsible
for information exchange on toxic chemicals;
(c) Establish technical cooperation with, and provide information to,
other countries, especially those with shortages of technical expertise,
including training in the interpretation of relevant technical data, such
as Environmental Health Criteria Documents, Health and Safety
Guides and International Chemical Safety Cards... ; monographs on
the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks of Chemicals to Humans . .;
and decision guidance documents ... as well as those submitted by
industry and other sources;
(d) Implement the PIC [Prior Informed Consent] procedures [which
were introduced in the 1989 UNEP Guidelines] as soon as possible
and, in the light of experience gained, invite relevant international
organizations such as UNEP, GATT, FAO, WHO and others, in their
respective area of competence to consider working expeditiously
towards the conclusion of legally binding instruments.
Id. 19.39.
41 Id. 19.4. Agenda 21 further recommends that:
[g]overnments, through the cooperation of relevant international
organizations and industry, where appropriate, should:
(a) Consider adopting policies based on accepted producer liability
principles, where appropriate, as well as precautionary, anticipatory
and life-cycle approaches to chemical management, covering manufac-
turing, trade, transport, use and disposal;
(b) Undertake concerted activities to reduce risks for toxic chemicals,
taking into account the entire life cycle of the chemicals. These
activities could encompass both regulatory and non-regulatory measures
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* "Strengthening of national capabilities and capacities for
management of chemicals;" 42
* "Prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and
dangerous products."43
Adopt policies and regulatory and non-regulatory measures to
etfy, and minimize exposure to, toxic chemicals y replacing them
with less toxic substitutes and ultimately phasing 
out the chemicals that
pose unreasonable and otherwise unmanageable risk to human health and
the environment and those that are toxic, persistent and bio-accumulativeand whose use can ot be adequ tely controlled;
(d) Increase efforts to identiry national needs 
for standard setting and
implementation in the context of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius
in order to minimize adverse effects of chemicals in food;Snational policies and adopt the necessary regulatory
ramework for prevention of accidents, preparedness and response,
inter alia, through land use planning, permit systems and reporting
regulations on accidents ... ;(f) Promote establishment and strengthening, as approdpriate, of
national poison control centres [sic] to ensure prompt an adequate
diagnosisof poisonings;- --() Reduce overdependence on the use of agricultural chemicals
through alternative arming practices, integrated pest management and
other appropropriate means;(h)Require manufacturers, importers and others handling toxic
chemicals to develop, with the cooperation of producers of suchchemicals, where applicable, emergency response procedures and
preparation of on-site and off-site emergency response plans;(i) Identify, assess, reduce and minimize as far as-feasible b environ-
mentally sound disposal practices, risks from storage o outdated
chemicas.
Id., 19.49 (emphasis added).
42 Id. 19.4. Agenda 21 also suggests that nations, in conjunction with the
UN, should,(a) Promote and support multidisciplinary approaches to chemical
safety problems;(b) Consider the nee d ofsta strengthen, where appropriate,
a national coordinating mechanism to provide a liaison for all parties
involved in chemical safety activities..
(c) Develop institutional mechanisms for the management of chemicals,
including effective means of enforcement;
(f) Develop, in cooperation with industry, emergency response
procedures, identifying means and equipment in industries and plants
necessary to reduce impacts of accidents.
Id., 19.59.4 Id., 19.4. Specifically, the drafters of Agenda 21 recommend, among
other things, that:
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Agenda 21's provisions for environmentally sound internation-
al management of toxic chemicals "involve variations upon classic
problems of political philosophy and public policy." 4 Given the
inherent scientifically uncertain and ethically ambiguous question
of acceptable levels of risk for producing, transporting, and
utilizing toxic products in international commerce, a variety of
alternative philosophical frameworks are theoretically available for
interpreting the aspirational objectives of Chapter 19 of Agenda
21. As perceptively noted in a recent essay about the ethical
dimensions of Agenda 21's toxic substances policy proposals, a
variety of potential hermeneutic readings of Chapter 19 are
possible.
First, utilitarianism can focus on the consequences of
policies and actions by maximizing aggregate utility of
relevant populations. Second, parietal optimalization can
be used to examine distributional changes that increase
utility for some members of relevant populations without
making anyone worse off. Third, notions of equality can
be used to evaluate the premise that those who receive the
benefits should bear the burdens. Notions of equality can
also assist in analysis of the premise that burdens should be
distributed in proportion to ability to bear them. Fourth,
contractual obligations for allocating benefits and burdens
can be studied. Fifth, Rawlsian theories of justice can be
evaluated to help resolve problems of distribution of
burdens. Such theories stem from the concept that each
[t]here is currently no global international agreement on traffic in toxic
and dangerous products (toxic and dangerous products are those that
are banned, severely restricted, withdrawn or not approved for use or
sale by Government in order to protect public health and the
environment) ....
Further strengthening of international and regional cooperation is
needed to prevent illegal transboundary movement of toxic and
dangerous products.
Id., 19.66-.67.
" John Lemons & Eleanor Saboski, The Scientific and Ethical Implications
of Agenda 21: Toxic Chemicals, in ETHICS & AGENDA 21: MORAL IMPLICA-
TIONS OF A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 69, 71 (Noel J. Brown & Pierre Quiblier
eds., 1994) [hereinafter "ETICS & AGENDA 21"].
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individual is to have equal rights to basic liberties compati-
ble with similar liberties for others, and from the principle
by which a policy is judged fair if it allocates equal benefits
to affected parties. Sixth, principles of deep ecology can be
evaluated for resolution of distributional burdens. Such
principles hold that humans should not interfere with the
structure, function, or beauty of ecosystems. 4
On a regional level of global affairs, both the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")4" and the
European Economic Community ("EEC")47 have undertaken a
variety of legal and administrative initiatives regarding various
aspects of production, marketing, notification, and risk assessment
of toxic products. For example, a series of OECD resolutions,
passed during the 1970s and 1980s, established a coordinated
method of assessing the ecotoxicities of various chemical com-
pounds before they were placed on the market.48 Similarly,
numerous EEC directives over the last thirty years have estab-
41 Id. at 71-72.
Problems of toxic chemicals are compounded because of the lack of
consensus whether, or to what extent, present generations have
obligations to those of the future. Philosophical viewpoints [inherent-
ly possible in Agenda 21's toxic chemical provisions] regarding
obligations to the future include:
()no moral obligations beyond the immediate future exist;
rights and interests of members of future generations are the
same as those of contemporary generations;
(3) moral obligations to the future exist, but the future is assigned
less weight than the present.
Id. at 72.
46 OECD is the organizational successor to the former Organization of
European Economic Cooperation, formed in 1948 to oversee the Marshall Plan.
See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 77. The
composition of the OECD has remained the same since 1960; it includes all
Western European states, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
and Japan. See id. OECD conducts studies, makes resource inventories, and
passes both binding and non-binding resolutions. See id. at 77-78.
47 The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
Community. See id. at 79. The representatives of the nine EEC countries met
in October of 1972 and "adopted a declaration proclaiming the necessity to
improve the quality of life, paying particular attention to nonmaterial values
and to protection of the environment." Id. at 79.
41 See id. at 309-10.
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lished comprehensive toxic product classification, packaging, and
handling requirements. 49 During the same period, several OECD
resolutions have developed notification and consultation proce-
dures among member states regarding toxic products.5 0 Since the
promulgation of the "Seveso Directive in 1982," 5 the EEC has
required:
member states to take measures necessary to ensure that all
manufacturers engaged in listed activities have to prove...
that they have identified the existing major accident
hazards, adopted appropriate safety measures, and provided
persons working on the site with sufficient information,
training and equipment in order to ensure their safety. 2
2.2.2. Toxic Wastes
International legal agreements entered into by nation-states
since the early 1970s have tended to single-out toxic wastes for
special legal treatment.53  In general, modern international
environmental legal agreements have followed pre-existing national
legislation in defining wastes subject to international standards, 54
49 See id. at 310-11.
s See id. at 311.
51 The Seveso Directive, Council Directive 82/501/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 230),
is named after the Italian town in which Europe's worst industrial accident
occurred. See id. at 312.
52 Id. Interestingly, "[a]fter the Sandoz accident near Basel, the Swiss
government decided to integrate the principles of the Seveso directive into its
national legislation." Id.
" "For example, the 1978 Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, the
1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution,
and the 1974 draft Convention of the Council of Europe all seek to eliminate
toxic pollutants." Id. at 313. "The problem of toxic or dangerous wastes is ex-
tremely complicated, if only due to the difficulty of defining 'wastes.'" Id.
5' See id. at 314. For example, "the OECD defined waste as 'any material
considered as waste or legally defined as waste in the country where it is
situated or through or to which it is conveyed.'" Id. (quoting OECD
Recommendation C(83)180 (Feb. 1, 1984)). Interestingly:
the annex to EEC Directive of March 20, 1978 enumerates 27
substances or materials which are given priority - whose presence in
wastes in such quantities or in such concentrations as to constitute a
risk to health or the environment confers on wastes the quality of"toxic" or "hazardous." This directive thus follows the same approach
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
as well as designating peculiarly troublesome waters as "toxic."55
Two areas of international legal regulation of toxic wastes merit
special concern: toxic waste management and transboundary
movement of toxic wastes.56
With regard to waste management issues, UNEP has labelled
the international transportation of toxic or dangerous wastes a
priority subject.5" UNEP empaneled a group of experts to deal
with this issue, experts who eventually promulgated the Cairo
Guidelines.58 The Cairo Guidelines, in turn, led to the adoption
of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal ("Basel
Convention") in March of 1989. 59
Regional waste policies are characterized by a waste-by-waste
approach. For example, the OECD - while drafting a general
policy encouraging nation-states within its jurisdiction to develop
a "comprehensive waste management policy" regarding the
"design, manufacture and use of products as well as the reclama-
tion and disposal of wastes"60 - focused regulation on specific
types of toxic wastes and listed harmful chemicals.61  Similarly,
the EEC has concentrated its regulatory approach 62 on specific
as international conventions regulating the dumping of wastes into the
sea, applicable rules for the protection of certain rivers such as the
Rhine, and Community directives aimed at protecting the aquatic
environment of the EEC.
Id. (citing Council Directive, Annex, 78/319, 1978 OJ. (L 84/43)).
55 See id.
56 See id.
17 See id. UNEP adopted legal priorities including waste transportation at
a 1981 conference in Montevideo. See id. at 315.
" See id. at 315. These directives received UNEP approval in 1987. See id.
59 See id. at 315, 326-28 (discussing the legal machinations ultimately leading
to the 1989 Basel Convention); see also UNITED NATIONS, ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. U-
NEP/IG.80/3 [herinafter Basel Convention] reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
60 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 316.
61 See id. at 317.
61 See id. The EEC, however, also adopted a general directive in July 1975
which set forth a general approach for all wastes of member nation-states.
These general principles, which have been developed since in UNEP
decisions, oblige states to take measures to promote the prevention,
recycling and processing of waste, encourage the reduction of
quantities of certain wastes, and establish or designate competent
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toxic wastes such as waste oils, polychlorinated terphenyls
("PCTs"), titanium dioxide industry wastes, and sewage sludge.63
In addition, signatories of the Antarctic Treaty System are subject
to a 1989 decision on waste disposal practices in the Antarctic
region which focused on plans and procedures for dealing with
specific potentially toxic wastes.64
With regard to the legal regulation of transboundary move-
ment of toxic wastes, four points deserve elaboration. First,
numerous treaties and other international agreements have been
in force for many years. 6 These agreements consider both the
quantity and danger of individual substances in seeking to regulate
the transboundary shipment of toxic wastes.66
A second point concerning transboundary movement of toxic
wastes is the existence of a customary norm established in the
1972 Stockholm Declaration and carried through to the 1992 Rio
Declaration. This norm requires nation-states "to ensure that
activities carried out within their jurisdiction ... do not cause
damage to the environment of other states" - as would a mishap
during the transboundary movement of toxic wastes.67 Indeed,
authorities to plan, organize, authorize and supervise the operations of
eliminating wastes.
Id. (citing Council Directive 75/442/EEC, arts. 7, 8, 1975 O.J. (L 194/39)).
63 See id.
64 See id. at 319 (citing Antarctic Treaty System, Decisions of the XVth A TCP
Meeting, reprinted in 20 ENvTL. POL. & L. 51 (1990)). "Numerous products
and substances are regulated: pesticides, PCBs, nonsterile soil and certain
packaging cannot be sent to Antarctica. Existing abandoned fuel drums and
fuel must be removed where practicable as well as radioactive materials,
electrical batteries, and heavy metals or harmful persistent compounds." Id.
65 Some examples of these agreements include: European Agreement
Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, 1957;
Regulation of the Carriage of Dangerous Substances on the Rhine, 1970;
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, 1986; Annex III to the Agreement of Cooperation for
the Protection and Amelioration of the Environment in the Frontier Region
Between Mexico and the United States, 1986, and; the Ottawa Agreement of
1986 between Canada and the United States concerning transfrontier movement
of dangerous wastes. See id. at 320-22.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 322 (citing Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human
Environment, Principle 21, June 16, 1972). The Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, Principle 2, which was adopted by the 1992 UN
Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro states that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
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the 1989 Basel Convention" is the most prominent and impor-
tant international agreement to reaffirm the rights of nation-states
to refuse dangerous wastes produced in other nation-states.6 9
A third point about the legal regulation of the transboundary
movement of toxic wastes is that there exists a customary rule of
international environmental law holding that states are responsible
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resourcespursuant to their own environmenta and developmen-
tal policies, an the res onsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or contro do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, June 14, 1992
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS
PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM RIO, U.N. Sales No. E.93.1.11 (1993).
6 See Basel Convention, supra note 59.
69 As delineated by one authority, some of the more important provisions
of the Basel Convention are that:
(1) A signatory state cannot send hazardous waste to another signatory
state that bans imports of it.
(2) A signatory state cannot ship hazardous waste to any country that
has not signed the treaty.
(3) Every country has the sovereign right to refuse to accept a
shipment of hazardous wastes.
(4) Before an exporting country can start a shipment on its way, it
must have the importing country's consent in writing.(5) No signatory country may ship hazardous waste to another
signatory state if the importing country does not have the facilities to
dispose of the waste in an environmentally sound manner.
(6) When an importing country proves unable to dispose of legally
imported waste in an environmentally sound way, then the exporting
state has a duty either to take it back or to find some other way of
disposing of it in an environmentally sound manner.
(7) The Convention declares that "illegal traffic in hazardous wastes iscriminal."
(8) Shipments of hazardous waste must be packaged, labelled, and
transported in conformity with generally accepted and recognized
international rules and standards.
(9) Bilateral agreements may be made within and without the
Convention, but the agreements must conform to the terms of the
Basel Convention and be no less environmentally sound.
(10) The Convention calls for international cooperation involving the
training of technicians, the exchange of information and the transfer
of technology.
(11) The Convention sets up a secretariat to supervise and facilitate its
implementation.
(12) The Convention asks that less hazardous waste be generated and
that it be disposed of as close to its source as possible.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 328.
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for their own activities as well as the activities of those over
whom they exercise control.70 Accordingly, states can be held
accountable for transboundary environmental damage which
emanates from within their borders and subsequently causes
environmental damage within the borders of other nation-states,
even though such damages may be caused by a private party.
7'
Fourth, the drafters of Agenda 21 in Rio in 1992 created an
impressive body of "soft law." Chapter 20 of Agenda 21 calls for
greater international efforts regarding the following:
* "Promoting the prevention and minimization of
hazardous waste; " 72
70 See id. at 122-25; see generally 5 RECIEL No. 4 (1996) (discussing
international environmental damage in symposium).
71 See id.
72 AGENDA 21, supra note 31, 11 20.9 to 20.19. Agenda 21 provides that:
The following activities should be undertaken:
(a) Governments should establish or modify standards or purchasing
specifications to avoid discrimination against recycled materials,
provided that those materials are environmentally sound;
b) Governments, according to their possibilities and with the help of
multilateral cooperation, should provide economic or regulatory
incentives, where appropriate, to stimulate industrial innovation
towards cleaner production methods, to encourage industry to invest
in preventative and/or recycling technologies so as to ensure environ-
mentally sound management of all hazardous wastes, including
recyclable wastes, and to encourage waste minimization investments;
(c) Governments should intensify research and development activities
on cost-effective alternatives for processes and substances that currently
result in the generation of hazardous wastes that pose particular
problems for environmentally sound disposal or treatment, the
possibility of ultimate phase-out of those substances that present an
unreasonable or otherwise unmanageable risk and are toxic, persistent
and bio-accumulative to be considered as soon as practicable.
Emphasis should be given to alternatives that could be economically
accessible to developing countries;
(d) Governments, according to their capacities and available resources
and with the cooperation of the United Nations and other relevant
organizations and industries, as appro riate, should support the
establishment of domestic facilities to handle hazardous wastes of
domestic origin;
(e) Governments of developed countries should promote the transfer
of environmentally sound technologies and know-how on clean
technologies and low-waste production to developing countries in
conformity with Chapter 34, which will bring about changes to sustain
innovation. Governments should cooperate with industry to develop
guidelines and codes of conduct, where appropriate, leading to cleaner
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* "Promoting and strengthening institutional capacities in
hazardous waste management;"7 3
roduction through sectoral trade industry associations;
fGovernments should encourage industry to treat, recycle, reuse and
dpose of wastes at the source of generation, or as close as possible
thereto, whenever hazardous waste generation is unavoidable and when
it is both economically and environmentally efficient for industry to
do so;
(g) Governments should encourage technology assessments, for
example through the use of technology assessment centres;
(h) Governments should promote cleaner production through the
establishment of centres providing training and information on
environmentally sound technologies;
(i) Industry should establish environmental management systems,
including environmental auditing of its production or distribution
sites, in order to identify where the installation of cleaner production
methods is needed;
() A relevant and competent United Nations organization should take
the lead, in cooperation with other organizations, to develop guidelines
for estimating the costs and benefits of various approaches to the
adoption of cleaner production and waste minimization and environ-
mentally sound management of hazardous wastes, including rehabilita-
tion of contaminated sites, taking into account, where appropriate, the
report of the 1991 Nairobi meeting of government-designated experts
on an international strategy and an action programme, including
technical guidelines for the environmentally sound management of haz-
ardous wastes; in particular in the context of the work of the Basel
Convention, being developed under the UNEP secretariat;
(k) Governments should establish regulations that lay down the
ultimate responsibility of industries for environmentally sound disposal
of the hazardous wastes their activities generate.
Id. 20.13.
73 Id. 20.20 to 20.31. Agenda 21 provides that:
The following activities should be undertaken:
(a) Governments should establish and maintain inventories, including
computerized inventories, of hazardous wastes and their treatment7
disposal sites, as well as of contaminated sites that require rehabilita-
tion, and assess exposure and risk to human health and the environ-
ment; they should also identify the measures required to clean up the
disposal sites. Industry should make the necessary information
available;
(b) Governments, industry and international organizations should
collaborate in developing guidelines and easy-to-implement methods for
the characterization and classification of hazardous wastes;
(c) Governments should carry out exposure and health assessments of
populations residing near uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and
initiate remedial measures;
(d) International organizations should develop improved health-based
criteria, taking into account national decisionmaking processes, and
assist in the preparation of practical technical guidelines for the
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0 "Promoting and strengthening international coopera-
tion in the management of transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes;" 74
prevention, minimization and safe handling and disposal of hazardous
wastes;
(e) Governments of developing countries should encourage inter-
disciplinary and intersectoral groups, in cooperation with international
organizations and agencies, to implement training and research
activities related to evaluation, prevention and control of hazardous
waste health risks. Such groups should serve as models to develop
similar regional programmes;
(f) Governments, according to their capacities and available resources
and with the cooperation of the United Nations and other relevant
organizations as appropriate, should encourage as far as possible the
establishment of combined treatment/disposal facilities for hazardous
wastes in small- and medium-sized industries;
(g) Governments should promote identification and clean-up of sites
o hazardous wastes in collaboration with industry and international
organizations. Technologies, expertise and financing should be
available for this purpose, as far as possible and when appropriate with
the application of the "polluter pays" principle;
(h) Governments should ascertain that their military establishments
conform to their nationally applicable environmental norms in the
treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes.
Id. 20.22.
74 Id. 11 20.32 to 20.38. Agenda 21 provides that:
Governments, according to their capacities and available resources and
with the cooperation of United Nations and other relevant organiza-
tions, as appropriate, should:
(a) Incorporate the notification procedure called for in the Basel
Convention and relevant regional conventions, as well as in their
annexes, into national legislation;
(b) Formulate, where appropriate, regional agreements such as the
Bamako Convention regulating the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes;
(c) Help promote the compatibility and complementarity of such
regional agreements with international conventions and protocols;
(d) Strengthen national and regional capacities and capabilities to
monitor and control the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes;
(e) Promote the development of clear criteria and guidelines, within
the framework of the Basel Convention and regional conventions, as
appropriate, for environmentally and economically sound operation in
resource recovery, recycling reclamation, direct use or alternative uses
and for determination of acceptable recovery practices, including
recovery levels where feasible and appropriate, with a view to
psreventing abuses and false presentation in the above operations;
0Consider setting up, at national and regional levels, as appropriate,
systems for monitoring and surveillance of the transb oundary
movements of hazardous wastes;
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9 "Preventing illegal international traffic in hazardous
wastes."75
Given the legal evolution of transboundary movement of toxic
wastes from a customary "do no harm" principle, to various
written agreements between nation-states, to the aspirational
propositions of Agenda 21's Chapter 20, it is useful to synthesize
the overarching issues which link international toxic products
policy"6 and international toxic wastes policy.'
Professor Eric Katz has identified four basic issues regarding
potentially toxic industrial products and wastes. He observes the
following key pragmatic problems with toxic substances, and
obliquely refers to what is referred to earlier in this Article as the
transsectoral environmental problematique:
First, ascertaining the actual risks involved, by discovering
the potential harmful affects [sic] of the waste and the
relevant probabilities of negative outcomes. Second,
(g) Develop guidelines for the assessment of environmentally sound
treatment of hazardous wastes;
(h) Develop guidelines for the identification of hazardous wastes at the
national level, taking into account existing internationally - and,
where appropriate, regionally - agreed criteria and prepare a list of
hazard profiles for the hazardous wastes listed in national legislation;
(i)Develop and use appropriate methods for testing, characterizing and
classifying hazardous wastes and adopt or adapt safety standards and
principles for managing hazardous wastes in an environmentally sound
way.
Id. 20.34.
11 Id. 20.39 to 20.46. Agenda 21 provides that:
Governments, according to their capacities and available resources and
with the cooperation of the United Nations and other relevant
organizations, as appropriate, should:
(a) Adopt, where necessary, and implement legislation to prevent the
illegal import and export of hazardous wastes;
(b) Develop appropriate national enforcement programmes to monitor
compliance with such legislation, detect and deter violations through
appropriate penalties and give special attention to those who are
kiiown to have conducted illegal traffic in hazardous wastes and to
hazardous wastes that are particularly susceptible to illegal traffic.
Id. 20.42.
76 See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
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adopting policies that will terminate (or greatly reduce) the
immediate harms. Third, planning for the future, long-
range reduction of the waste stream, so as to eliminate (or
generally reduce) the source of the negative outcomes. A
fourth basic issue arises because of the global nature of
waste/pollution problems, and because of the multi-
national character of Agenda 21: respecting issues of
international equity or justice by developing differing
criteria for nations at different levels of development.78
Moreover, Katz posits what he calls:
three sets of potential ethical [and instrumentalist] con-
flicts, or problems, that are raised by a consideration of the
values underlying the [toxic substances] policy recommen-
dations of... Agenda 21:
(1) Need to balance competing interests of governments,
industry and private individuals;
(2) Need to balance economic incentives, education, and
legislation as the proper means for changes in attitude and
lifestyle;
(3) Need to balance human-centered policy goals with the
direct preservation of the natural environment. 9
78 Eric Katz, Ethical Issues and Agenda 21: Waste and Pollution Policies in
ETHIcs & AGENDA 21, supra note 44, at 91-92. Professor Katz sees philosophi-
cal linkages between four waste/pollution chapters of Agenda 21. As he
observes:
Chapter 19 focuses on toxic chemicals; Chapter 20 on hazardous waste;
Chapter 21 on solid waste, including sewage; and Chapter 22 on
radioactive waste. The different types of wastes require differing sets
of technological responses - the treatment of sewage will be diffe-rent
than the treatment of radioactive waste; however, the ethical issues
that arise in all four chapters are similar.
Id. at 91. This Article, however, will use Katz's schemata to focus only on
toxic products and wastes.
"' Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
2.3. The Need for Incentive-Based Environmental Experimen-
tation
As discussed in Section 2.2., the current international paradigm
for management of transboundary toxic substances risk, while
motivated by good intentions, is fragmented, weak, and resembles
an ad hoc assemblage of rules, standards, practices, exhortations,
and precatory goals. An essential feature of the current interna-
tional paradigm is an excessive reliance on command and control
environmental regulations. These regulations, in turn, are largely
promulgated, drafted, and enforced by national government
officials in the public sectors of leading developed, Western-style
nation-states, and contain isolated - and merely aspirational -
attempts by international political authorities and public institu-
tions to effectively promote and blend disparate national rules into
an international approach. In this respect, it appears that the
United States' traditional command and control environmental
regulatory paradigm is the most prominent and widely-emulated
public environmental regulatory system in the world today.8"
As argued by Professor Richard B. Stewart, however, the
predominant U.S. command and control model of environmental
regulation that has developed over the past twenty-five years
suffers from numerous policy failings.81 First, Stewart points out
80 Cf Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 590-91 (1996) [hereinafter A Failing Paradigm]
("While other industrialized nations rely predominantly on command and
control measures to achieve environmental regulation, the dysfunctions of the
command system in those countries are far less than those in the United States.
Western European nations and Japan are smaller and less internally diverse. In
many instances, there is a tradition of cooperation between government and
industry in these nations."). Stewart does not dispute the powerful influence
of the U.S. environmental command and control paradigm. Indeed, he
concedes that "[tihere is, however, a danger that centralized environmental
regulation by the Commission of the European Communities will replicate some
of the problems that now plague the United States." Id. at 591, n.23 (emphasis
added) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Antidotes for the "American Disease", 20
ECOLOGY L.Q. 85 (1993)).
81 As Stewart poignantly writes:
[t]he current paradigm of environmental regulation in the United
States assumes that economic actors (including producers and
consumers) in a capitalist market-based economy will not take
measures to reduce pollution, wastes, and other forms of environ-
mental degradation unless coerced by government to do so. Further, the
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that U.S. command and control environmental regulation,
supervised and enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), is the functional equivalent of the various central
planning systems of now-collapsed Eastern European nations. The
Eastern European systems failed because of "the inability of
central planners to gather and process the information needed to
write directives appropriately responsive to the diverse and
changing conditions of different economic actors."82 Thus, U.S.
"EPA regulation writers," and those public environmental
regulatory officials around the world who are influenced by the
U.S. example, "face grave difficulties in gathering information
about the diverse circumstances of different facilities and devising
requirements that are responsive to these different circumstanc-
es."
83
A second related deficiency of the current U.S. environmental
regulatory approach is its "creat[ion] [of] enormous economic
waste by failing to equalize the marginal costs of control of the
same pollutant across different sources.8 According to Stewart:
Uniform 'one size fits all' requirements are adopted for
categories of industrial facilities, ignoring large variations
in the costs of control among different facilities within the
same category. In addition, the piecemeal and uncoordi-
nated character of regulation writing results in large
differences in the marginal costs of control among different
categories of facilities. As a result, the costs of achieving
a given overall level of pollution control under the
centralized command system run up to twice as much, or
more, as what they would be under market-based systems,
such as pollution fees or tradeable pollution permits, that
tend to equalize the marginal costs of control among
paradigm holds that the ethically appropriate and most effective way
to exercise such coercion is through command and control regulations
taht [sic] prescribe in detail what market actors must or must not do in
order to reduce discharges of pollution and waste.
A Failing Paradigm, supra note 80, at 585 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 587.
83 Id.
11 Id. at 587-88.
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different sources."5
Third, the prevailing American-style of environmental
regulation, widely emulated by other nation-states and the
international community, "wastes tens of billions of dollars
annually. These wasted resources could be used for investment in
higher levels of environmental quality or for meeting other
societal needs." 6
Professor Stewart argues that a fourth policy failing of this
traditional environmental paradigm is the natural tendency for
"[t]he clumsy dysfunctions of the command system ... [to]
become more acute as regulators [following this model] adopt ever
more detailed requirements in a continual effort to reduce
pollution and waste per unit of output, in order to maintain or
improve environmental quality in the face of continued economic
growth." Unfortunately, "the incremental economic and
administrative costs of further controls... dwarf the incremental
environmental benefits." 8
A fifth policy deficiency of direct, centralized public environ-
mental regulation is "its inherent information-gathering and
decision-making limitations . ... ." As Stewart explains, "cen-
tralized [command and control] regulation produces a fragmented
jumble of particularistic commands that cannot meet the needs for
intelligent priority setting, and for integrated pollution and waste
prevention and control on a multimedia, facility-by-facility or
region-by-region basis."90 A sixth problem is that "[c]entralized
technology-based command and control regulation also has been
strikingly ineffective in dealing with the behavior of small or
diffuse pollution sources,"91 such as small chemical plants and
modest-sized toxic waste facilities.
A seventh shortcoming of the dominant American-style is the
85 Id. at 588 (citing Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (summarizing findings of
economic studies)).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 588-89.
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"[r]eliance on technology-based regulatory requirements resut[ing]
in overcontrol of some environmental problems, undercontrol of
others, and failure to tailor measures in an integrated fashion
responsive to the circumstances of particular ecosystems."92
Eighth, in an analogous way, based on Stewart's analysis, "[t]he
necessarily fragmented proliferation, under different statutory
programs, of detailed requirements for control of discharges from
specific waste streams into particular media prevents facility
managers from adopting integrated approaches to reduce environ-
mental risks at less cost."93 Thus,
[f]or example, a joint EPA-industry study of a major
refinery found that aggregate environmental risks could be
reduced, and compliance costs sharply reduced, through an
integrated approach that would reduce the level of control
of some waste streams while increasing the level of control
of others. The EPA concluded, however, that the existing
network of regulations applicable to the facility did not
permit such flexibility.
94
A ninth deficiency of the American-led environmental
regulatory policy is that, "[w]hile command and control regulation
can ensure adoption of existing technologies, it does not create
appropriate incentives for the development of new technologies
and production methods to further reduce pollution" of various
kinds.95 Tenth, command and control environmental regulations
have a propensity to focus on specific practices at the expense of
92 Id. at 589.
93 Id.
94 Id.
' Id. According to Professor Stewart:
In order to achieve the goal of maintaining or improving environ-
mental quality, while stil maintaining economic growth, enterprises
must be given both the incentive and the flexibility to devise and
adopt innovative, resource-efficient methods of production. ....
[C]ommand regulation may actually impede such innovation. The
coercive logic of the command paradigm is thus at odds with the need
to encourage enterprises to pursue competitive strategies and techno-
logical innovations based on resource efficiency, and to adopt
integrated environmental risk management and control measures.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the greater goal of pollution reduction. "[C]ommand regulation
is an exercise in micromanagement that ignores the need for
appropriate macro-level incentives and revisions in non-regulatory
government measures and policies [such as government procure-
ment policies mandating recycled goods for government purchase]
that affect resource use, in order to shift the sectoral pattern of
economic activity away from sectors that consume and degrade
natural resources."96
An eleventh policy defect of the American environmental
regulatory system, in Stewart's view, consists of "[f]ar-reaching
environmental liabilit[y]" 7 features, like those imposed on a
staggering number of "potentially responsible parties" by draconi-
an hazardous waste cleanup laws like the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). s Combined with more traditional command and
control laws, these cleanup laws impose extensive liability and
"create enormous transaction costs because of the inherent
complexities of determining appropriate [governmentally com-
manded and controlled cleanup] remedies and the large number of
parties charged with liability."
99
Finally, a twelfth policy defect of the prevailing American
method of environmental regulation, according to Stewart, is that
"[t]he dysfunctions of our command centered environmental
regulatory system are exacerbated by the adversary culture ...
and the legal superimposition of formalized decision-making
procedures, and searching judicial review over the central planning
process."'0'
96 Id. at 589-90 (citing ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND
MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY (Robert Costanza ed., 1991)).
97 Id. at 590.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 590 (referring to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1994)). "The
sweeping scope of liability also generates high risk-bearing costs and fails to
provide appropriate caretaking incentives." Id.
1"0 Id. Professor Stewart opines that "[b]y regulating vital decisions about
environmental risk management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal
bureaucratic process, the command and control system necessarily runs a
serious democracy deficit." Id.
Despite Professor Stewart's unrelenting attack on the prevailing command
and control approach of American environmental law, see supra notes 80-100
and accompanying text, it should be acknowledged that during the last few
years the EPA has initiated various programs to begin to modify the predomi-
nant command and control environmental law paradigm in the United States.
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With regard to international transboundary risk from toxic
substances, what is to be done to begin a strategic movement away
from present disparate, nationally-dominant, public law, command
and control regimes governing toxic substances, which are loosely
linked with assorted international public law requirements and
procedures? Could some bold, new, and imaginative private
efforts to prevent and abate risks from transboundary movement
of multi-media toxic substances help to ameliorate the transsectoral
environmental problematique in this policy area? Could govern-
mental institutions indirectly encourage responsible, public-
regarding behavior by private parties in reducing transboundary
toxic substances risk, thereby crafting a workable framework for
international, incentive-based environmental experimentation?
Alternatively, would it make any sense to advocate adoptinng a
more direct and intrusive system of command and control
environmental regulation of toxic substances be on a global scale?
As envisioned by Professor Stewart, "[a]doption of market-
based incentives and flexible contract-based instruments for
environmental protection" on an international basis would be an
important and salutary strategy for improving international
environmental law.01 Stewart's reasoning and conclusion are
persuasive. However, in designing such a system for indirect
public encouragement of private management of transboundary
toxic substances risk, what analogous concepts could we employ?
Section 3, below, examines some models and metaphors along
these lines.
3. ANALOGIES FOR ENCOURAGING PRIVATE
ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP OF Toxic SUBSTANCES
THROUGH PUBLICLY STRUCTURED INCENTIVES
The key to improving toxic substances management on the
See 1996 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF FOURTH ANNUAL FALL MEETING [hereinafter FOURTH
SONREEL PROCEEDINGS], Jonathan Z. Cannon, Reinventing Environmental
Protection-Talking Points, Tab 2 (BEYOND COMPLIANCE: MAKING REGULA-
TORY REFORM WORK FOR YOU). These reforms have thus far been
unimportant. See Blomquist, Government's Role Regarding Industrial Pollution
Prevention in the United States, supra note 2, at 438 (criticizing the -program of
the month" political/public relations approach of the EPA in recent years in
trying to show progress in going beyond the traditional command and control
environmental paradigm).
101 A Failing Paradigm, supra note 80, at 595.
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international level emerges from two stark realities, one political
and one economic: (1) "the weakness and fragmentation of
international political authority and institutions" 0 2 at the end of
the twentieth century, and (2) the "rapidly increasing global
economic integration" °3 due to burgeoning international trade,
more extensive travel, and major advances in communications and
information technologyY°4  Given these realities, a radical
teleologica s105 argument would tend to reject global international
regional, subregional, and bilateral governmental organizations.
Any international political authority or international public
institution would be written off, pursuant to this view, as useless
or irrelevant in attempting to fashion solutions to the emerging
international environmental and economic issues of managing
transboundary toxic substances risk.
I contend, however, that a moderate, or balanced, teleological
approach of linking desired ends with pragmatic and efficient
102 Id.
103 Id.
1o4 See, e.g., Jay G. Martin, Strategic Realities in the 1990s for Multinational
Oil Companies' Future Investment in Foreign Countries, 1 FOURTH SONREEL
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 100, Tab 1 (THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
PETROLEUM BUSINESS: NEW COMPETITIVE FRONTIERS AND KEY FACTORS
FOR SUCCESS). According to Martin, by way of illustration of increased
globalization in this industry:
* International oil companies and national oil companies will
restructure themselves with increasing alliances and cross shareholdings
to supply capital and share risks. Oil industry rationalization, asset
swaps and downsizing will continue in the United States and other...
producing areas.
* Competitive advantage will rest with massive companies or small,
strong companies with significant market share in targeted markets.
Medium-sized companies with no significant market share or competi-
tive advantage will be increasingly vulnerable to competition and
market forces.
* Environmental regulations and expectations will create substantial
demands on capital. Environmental strategy will be a differentiator in
corporate approaches, perhaps determining survival and success,
particularly downstream.
Id.
'05 Teleology is a "philosophical doctrine that all of nature, or at least
intentional agents, are goal-irected or functionally organized." THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 791 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
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means"* has the potential of yielding more interesting, fruitful,
and useful insights regarding these vexing international public
policy problems of transboundary toxic substances risk than the
radical model mentioned above. My approach looks first at
functional models of economic incentives, broadly interpreted to
include such indirect public and quasi-public environmental policy
tools as tradeable permits, challenge regulations, subsidies, liability,
information disclosure, and technical assistance. These relatively
non-prescriptive, private techniques, when properly deployed, can,
similar to Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand,""0 7 indirectly achieve
public-regarding ends linked to international environmental
stewardship of toxic substances. My balanced teleological
approach also examines various institutional metaphors, compar-
'I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Judge Richard A. Posner for the
inspiration for this approach. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOM-
ING LAW (1995). Posner defines a "pragmatic approach" to the law as one,
that is practical and instrumental rather than essentialist-interested in
what works and what is useful rather than in what 'really' is. It is
therefore forward-looking, valuing continuity with the past only so far
as such continuity can help us cope with the problems of the present
and of the future....
The pragmatist believes in progress without pretending to be able to
define it, and believes that it can be effected by deliberate human
action. These beliefs are connected with the instrumental character of
pragmatism. It is a philosophy of action and of betterment ....
Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
107 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) reprinted in 39
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
1952):
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to
employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to
direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such
a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By
pursuinWg his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
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ing global intergovernmental organizations to global non-govern-
mental organizations, international regional governmental
organizations to international subregional ones, and bilateral
organizations to federal political systems. In taking a metaphori-
cal approach, 1°' my purpose is to use whatever insights can be
gained in pondering indirect and relatively non-intrusive methods
that governmental and non-governmental organizations can utilize
in order to encourage responsible private management approaches
to public environmental problems.
3.1. Environmental Policy Tool Models
3.1.1. Tradeable Permits
The regulatory tool1 9 of tradeable permits are "government-
issued permits that allow the owner to emit a specific quantity of
pollutants [or to use specific quantities of toxic substances] over
a specified period, and which can be bought from and sold to
others.""" In the relatively isolated instances when this tool has
been used, "[t]he government typically caps aggregate emissions
[or substance-use quantities] from sources within a geographic
region by issuing only the number of permits consistent with
environmental goals" of stabilizing or reducing ambient pollution
loads or risks of exposure to toxic substances."' "A relatively
new approach to tradeable emissions is an 'open market,' in which
unregulated sources [like publicly-spirited citizen groups] may opt
into the program voluntarily.""' In the United States, "[e]mis-
sions trading has been used most widely under the Clean Air Act
and to a more limited degree to address water quality issues."'
108 See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORIcAL TERMS 100-01
(2d ed. 1991) (defining a metaphor as "[cihanging a word from its literal
meaning to one not properly applicable but anaogous to it; assertion of
identity rather than 
.. likeness).
109 Throughout Section 3.1, I rely heavily on an excellent report, U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
TOOLS: A USER'S GUIDE, OTA-ENV-634 (1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY TOOLS] (envisioning existing governmental approaches to environmen-
tal policy as a "toolbox" ful of different "tools" and explaining the differences
between single-source and multisource tools).
110 Id. at 10 tbl.1-1.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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Some economic theorists have suggested the plausibility of
using a permit trading scheme to prevent or alter both the
production and consumption of certain toxic substances. For
example, these analysts have extolled the virtues of what they call
a "permit-trading phasedown" of the use of cadmium in coatings,
pigments, and stabilizers." 4 Discussing the proposal from the
standpoint of a possible domestic policy option for American
environmental regulators, they observe the following:
As a practical matter, the cadmium market seems to be
suited to such a permit-trading system. First, it may be
administratively easier to target directly the quantity of
cadmium rather than its price, particularly given the
doubts as to whether a cadmium tax will reduce use.
Second, the use of cadmium, other than for nickel-cadmi-
um batteries, is already stable or declining. Quantity
targets using permits might therefore be more easily agreed
upon in a market with growing demand (that is, pressures
to release the quantity cap may be less in a declining
market). Finally, because of the small number of refiners
and importers of refined cadmium, policing the purchases
of cadmium metal may not be too difficult. Control may
also be relatively easy for imports of intermediate products
(such as pigments and stabilizers) that contain cadmium.
The tradeable-permit scheme is best viewed in compari-
son to the likely ban or cutback on the uses of cadmium
that might be expected under command-and-control
regulation. In some applications, cadmium remains
strongly preferred [on the marketplace] over possible
substitutes. A general ban or proportional cutback in
cadmium use would impose high costs on these uses, but
a tradeable-permit scheme, like a tax mechanism, would
allow market forces to allocate cadmium to these uses
where it is of high value. In addition, the process of
reallocation through taxes or trading avoids a burdensome
114 See ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 22, at 101. For a discussion of
the worldwide production and use of cadmium, the market for cadmium, the
properties of cadmium, and the uses of cadmium, see id. at 80-87.
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administrative process of determining exemptions from the
ban, such as occurred under Sweden's program to restrict
cadmium.11
The actual mechanics of a tradeable-permit program for
reducing cadmium use,
would begin by allocating annual permits to existing
purchasers of refined cadmium and imported intermediate
cadmium products. The initial permits would authorize
the use of cadmium at levels somewhat below existing use.
Each year, the amount of cadmium permitted would be
reduced. These permits would be tradable [sic] among
firms. The program would be terminated after some
interval (perhaps 10 years), at which point cadmium use
would be either eliminated or limited to a rate of use
determined for each product type. The procedures could
be essentially the same as those used in the successful
phasedown of lead in gasoline.
During the phasedown, industries that could easily
substitute away from cadmium use would do so, selling
their permits to firms that found it more costly to reduce
cadmium use. Overall use of cadmium would be cut back
to the administratively determined level, with the reduc-
tion in use allocated among firms in a cost-efficient manner
as a result of the trades.1
16
Another type of toxic substances tradeable permit scheme
might also be used to provide incentives to private firms to reduce
formaldehyde use and emissions. 17  With regard to a proposal
for an American formaldehyde tradeable permit system,
[a] permit trading scheme that allowed producers to bid for
the right to manufacture formaldehyde could help ensure
11 Id. at 101.
Id. at 101-02 (citation omitted).
117 See id. at 65. For a discussion of formaldehyde's production, uses, health
effects, and environmental effects, see id. at 53-56.
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that air- and water-quality standards were met, although
the direct costs of permits are less predictable than tax
rates. The quantity of'permits made available, like tax
rates, might also be regionally tailored to be more restric-
tive in air- or water-quality nonattainment regions.
Permits could be issued and tradable [sic] within geograph-
ic regions surrounding the facilities producing formalde-
hyde, with the number of permits available set according
to air- and water-quality standards relevant to the area.
High costs of transporting formaldehyde would serve as a
check on the movement of formaldehyde from low-permit-
fee locations to high-permit-fee locales, provided the cost
of a permit was less than the transportation costs .... n1s
A question remains as to what type of institution could
practically issue and administer a toxic substances tradeable permit
system. 9 Another basic problem with attempting to provide
international economic incentives for reduction and control of
toxic substances such as cadmium and formaldehyde is the
variability of toxic exposures and ambient environmental qualities
in different parts of the world. Given similarly-shared risks from
toxic substances among various nation-states, (for example,
common pollution problems along the U.S.-Mexico border, or the
French-German border) some type of tradeable permit system
might be useful and workable on a bilateral or regional basis.
At the global level, it may be theoretically worthwhile for
policymakers to consider "tradeable greenhouse gas permits" (for
the global problem of potentially excessive buildup of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases)12 and tradeable chlorofluor-
1I Id. at 65 (citation omitted). It should be noted that tradeable emission
incentives are not appropriate or all types of toxic substances. A prime
example is the case ofc~llorinated solvents such as perchloroethylene ("PERC'),
trichloroethylene ("TCE") and methylene chloride ("METH"), which are used
in various industrial cleaning applications. See infra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text. Tradeable emissions permits are economically inappropri-
ate for chlorinated solvents because of the high number of industrial users,
excessive monitoring and enforcement costs, and the potential for anomalous
results that could lead to disincentives for proper disposal and illegal dumping.
See EcONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 22, at 32-33 tbl.2-6.
19 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
120 A Failing Paradigm, supra note 80, at 595.
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ocarbon ("CFC") gas permits (to abate the breakdown of the
protective stratospheric ozone shield from CFC gases emitted
from locales around the world).
3.1.2. Pollution or Substance Charges
Pollution or substance charges (sometimes referred to as taxes)
possess a variety of characteristics. First, they require "a regulated
entity to pay a fixed dollar amount for each unit of pollution
emitted or disposed" or each unit of a regulated substance
used.121 Second, these "charges do not set a limit on emissions
or production,"1" unlike tradeable emission programs which
enforce an overall ceiling on various externalities. "Instead, the
government must calculate what level of charge will change the
behavior of regulated entities enough to achieve environmental
objectives." 1" Thus, "[s]ources are free to choose whether to
emit [or dispose of] pollution," or to use various chemical
substances in the firms' varying production processes; however, in
such cases they must pay the given charge or tax. 24 Alternative-
ly, firms may voluntarily opt to "pay for the installation of
controls to reduce emissions."" In either scenario, the theoreti-
cal objective is to reduce toxics and reduce environmental risk.126
121 ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY TooLs, supra note 109, at 11 tbl.1-1.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Pollution charges raise revenue that can be used to operate the
[respective] program or to go to general revenues. Pollution charges
[have been] used widely as a revenue-raising instrument, set at a level
adequate to help fund regulatory programs but too low to significantly
change behavior....
Much of the economic literature focuses on the potential of
pollution charges to send accurate signals to entities about the cost of
using the environment's capacity to assimilate waste and to force
entities to pay for the full societal costs of their pollution-'internal-
izing the externalities,' in economic jargon. However, setting a
pollution charge at a level that accurately reflects full societal
costs-neither higher [n]or lower-is probably impractical because of
the enormous analytical and data requirements required.
In order to act as an incentive, pollution charges must vary
according to the amount of pollution produced. Such variation can
provide a direct incentive for sources to cut back on their emissions
and waste. Flat rate structures provide little incentive to reduce
pollution. For example, a uniform solid waste disposal fee per
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The United States and several European countries have
experimented with various types of pollution charges. These
charges are used widely in the United States "for collection and
disposal of commercial, industrial, and household waste,"'27 but
are rarer in the United States for targeted water discharges12 and
air emissions.129 "Pollution charges are used more frequently in
Europe than in the United States;" these charges focus on air
pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, in addition
to industrial and hazardous waste."30
An excise tax on the sale of toxic chlorinated solvents 131 is
a type of pollution or substance charge that might be an appropri-
ate policy intervention to abate the use of these substances and
thereby encourage more responsible private management of
household [or firm] that is unrelated to the amount generated does not
provide an incentive to reduce waste.
Id. at 119.
127 Id. at 121 (discussing volume-based verses flat fee charges paid for waste
disposal in the United States).
128 Id. (stating that publicly owned treatment works ("POTWs") in the
United States charge fees for discharging into their systems and discussing a
proposed bill in New York in 1992 that would have established a pollution
charge program for water pollution).
129 "Air emission charges most often are set at a level designed to recover
administrative costs of state air quality programs, rather than to provide a
significant incentive for sources to reduce their emissions." Id.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 provide American environmental
regulators with a diverse menu of pollution charges in order to provide a
significant incentive to reduce emissions. See id. at 121-22.
130 Id. at 122.
For example, Sweden has placed charges on NO, [nitrogen oxide]
emissions, in order to speed up compliance with new emission
guidelines ... imposed in 1995. Charges are levied on the actual
emissions of heat and power producers with a capacity of over 10 MW
and production exceeding 50 GWh. The fees are then rebated to the
facilities subject to the charge, but on the basis of their energy
production. Thus funds are redistributed between high- and low-
emitting facilities. In 1992 the actual emissions reduction was between
30 and 40 percent, exceeding the predicted 20 to 25 percent reduction.
Several OECD member countries are also levying a pollution charge
on landfilled and incinerated wastes, as well as experimenting with pay-
per-bag systems.
Id.
131 For a discussion of four major categories of chlorinated solvents, their
major uses, and the chief health and environmental impacts, see ECONOMIC
INCENTIVEs, supra note 22, at 18-21 tbls.2-2 to 2-3.
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transboundary toxic substances risk. As explained in a recent
book published by the prestigious Washington, D.C.-based
Resources for the Future ("REF"),
[o]ne approach is to levy a virgin product tax on providers
and importers of virgin chlorinated solvents. Ideally, the
tax would be set at a level equal to the marginal environ-
mental and health damages associated with solvent emis-
sions. The size of the tax would vary by solvent to reflect
the relative differences in damages associated with emis-
sions of different solvents. Levying different tax rates on
different solvents might lead consumers to substitute one
solvent for another, but presumably this substitution
would be away from a higher-taxed and thus more-damag-
ing solvent toward the lesser-taxed and thus less-damaging
one.
To the extent possible, the tax might also vary by
solvent application to reflect the different marginal
emission damages associated with different uses. This type
of tailoring may be difficult, since a consumer could
purchase a low-taxed solvent for a stated use and then
actually use it in a riskier application. If the costs of
policing such substitution in use are high, an identical tax
schedule across the relevant set of applications may be
desirable. The tax would not be levied on sales of recycled
solvent, because the damages associated with releases of any
recycled solvent would presumably be captured in the tax
levied initially on the virgin solvent from which the
recycled solvent is derived."'
In theory, pollution or substance charges may also be suitable,
at strategic points of the substance life cycle, to create incentives
for reducing risk from other types of toxic substances like
formaldehyde. For example, while an American substance tax on
132 Id. at 31-34 (footnote omitted). "The incentive effects of this tax will
depend on the application of the solvent and the potential for containing the
resulting air emissions. The tax will increase the cost of solvent use in all
applications and, thus, will encourage users to search for [alternative substanc-
es]." Id.
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primary producers of formaldehyde at the front end of the
substance life cycle would probably make economic sense, 133 an
excise tax on consumers of final formaldehyde products would
likely be ineffective. 34  By way of another case of toxic sub-
stance use, an input tax on manufacturers of cadmium coatings,
pigments, and stabilizers would be a potentially effective incentive
to reduce cadmium use and disposal externalities. However, given
that many inputs of cadmium at the manufacturing stage of
various products may be inelastic, the effectiveness of a cadmium
input tax is problematic.13
While it is conceptually conceivable to envision various
internationally-structured pollution and product charges on toxic
substances likely to cross national borders, a number of drawbacks
exist to such a scheme. First, an epistemic problem exists.
Economists have considerable difficulty understanding the
133 See id. at 61.
An appealing incentive-based approach to limit formaldehyde emissions
into air and water during production processes is a product tax that
equals the marginal environmental and health damages associated with
the emissions. Because the number of primary producers of formalde-
hyde [in the United States] is fairly small compared with the number
of intermediate producers who use formaldehyde in their products, a
tax levied on primary producers may be administratively easier than
a tax levied on intermediate producers. The disadvantage of a tax
levied on primary producers, however, is that it will be passed forward
more heavily to applications for which there are few substitutes rather
than to applications whose environmental and health effects are largest.
Id.
134 See id. at 75-76.
[A final formaldehyde products] tax, if sufficiently high in relation to
demand elasticities for these products, could operate to better ensure
that consumers reduce their use of the products. . . [T]axes that
increase the price of products can significantly influence behavior.
There are several-disadvantages to an excise tax on formaldehyde
products, however. First, product off-gases and user sensitivit are
likely to vary widely; thus a uniform tax falls disproportionately on
all consumers and products and can generate a large excess burden......
[P]roduct-specific taxes varied to reflect off-gassing [variations among
different formaldehyde products] would be administratively complicat-
ed (although less complicated than emission taxes or emission permits).
Second, a tax does not encourage consumers to take mitigating actions
such as opening a window or applying a varnish or veneer or other
source barrier.
Id.
135 See id. at 94 tbl.4-5.
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domestic market dynamics of the production and consumption of
toxic substances within a single country, let alone understanding
the global market dynamics of production and demand curves for
toxic substances. Second, and related to the first point, this lack
of knowledge of the workings of the marketplace, and its likely
iterations given toxic substance charges or taxes, would add to the
complexity of setting a suitable charge. Third, equity issues exist
in imposing similar charges on developed versus developing
nations. Yet, without rough uniformity in charges, there would
be a tendency for producers and consumers of toxic substances to
engage in tax-avoidance behavior by structuring transactions to
take place in the country or region with the lowest substance tax
rate. Finally, given the general public unpopularity of taxes,
major industrial players would likely fiercely resist international
toxic substance or pollution charges.
3.1.3. Subsidies
The flip side of pollution or substance charges 3 6 is subsidies.
Environmental "[s]ubsidies are policy instruments that provide
various forms of financial assistance, which can act as an incentive
for entities to change their behavior or help entities having
difficulty complying with imposed standards."13 7  Subsidy
providers might consist of a government agency or agencies
disbursing various grants, preferential tax treatments, or no-
interest loans. Private parties can also be subsidy providers
through such mandatory government programs as deposit-refund
systems.138
Public environmental subsidies are not generally perceived as
being appropriately distributed to private parties, however, since,
[t]he use of subsidies historically has been affected by the
'polluter pays' principle, which says that entities should be
responsible financially for cleaning up the pollution they
cause. Subsidies run counter to this principle. As a result,
many [environmental] public grant programs have subsi-
dized public facilities' pollution control efforts, such as
136 See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
117 ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY ToOLs, supra note 109, at 133.
138 See id. at 133-35.
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publicly owned wastewater treatment plants, but left
private sources of pollution largely on their own. Justifica-
tions for this differential treatment tend to focus on the
public nature of pollution from public sources, arguably
appropriate candidates for the use of public funds. Also,
public sources generally are not operating to make a profit,
unlike private facilities which at least in theory could
consider pollution control as part of the cost of doing
business.'39
In the United States, environmental subsidy programs have
been employed extensively in a variety of contexts: these range
from the Clean Water Act's publicly owned wastewater treatment
works construction grant program to local American communi-
ties, to EPA's Pollution Prevention Incentives for States ("PPIS")
grant program; from Design for Environment ("DFE") grants by
EPA to universities to research alternative chemical manufacturing
methods that would reduce the generation of harmful wastes
while simultaneously increasing industrial productivity, to
favorable tax breaks for firms investing in environmentally benign
technologies or engaging in environmentally appropriate behav-
ior.'4°
On a theoretical level, international subsidy schemes might be
used to encourage better private management of certain toxic
substances. A deposit-refund program for chlorinated solvent
disposal, for example, would provide an incentive for proper
disposal.'41 As explained in a recent study:
To remove ... [the] incentive [for illegal dumping of
chlorinated solvents] and avoid the social costs of illegal
disposal, a deposit-refund system might be imposed on all
parties accepting spent solvent for recycling and disposal of
residuals. Under this system, the solvent waste handler
would be required to pay a deposit to the government for
every pound of spent solvent accepted for recycling (or still
bottoms accepted for disposal). This deposit would be
139 Id. at 133-34.
140 See id. at 135-36.
141 See ECONOMIc INcENTIvEs, supra note 22, at 33 tbl.2-6.
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refundable in exchange for proof of recycling or proof of
legal disposal at a licensed hazardous waste incinerator. 42
A key advantage of subsidy schemes in encouraging responsi-
ble private management of toxic substances risk is their unusual
administrative flexibility; the diverse micro-economic characteris-
tics of different toxic substance producing industries can, theoreti-
cally, be efficiently addressed by a spectrum of individually-
tailored subsidies. To illustrate this point, two additional toxic
substance subsidy models are instructive and will be discussed
below: (a) a modified deposit-refund system for nickel-cadmium
batteries and (b) a customized deposit-refund or performance bond
scheme targeted at producers of brominated flame retardants
("BFR"s).
A modified deposit-refund program, with the goal of encourag-
ing private parties to recover cadmium from nickel-cadmium
batteries, would promote the "least-cost means for collection of
batteries."143 A typical deposit-refund mechanism is targeted at
the end-user and operates to increase the incentive of the consum-
er to return the product in an environmentally appropriate
manner. The traditional approach, however,
has two disadvantages in its application to nickel-cadmium
batteries. Reliance on the consumer to return batteries to
the retailer or manufacturer may not be the least-cost
means for collecting batteries. Further, given ... disposal
problems ... it seems appropriate that there should be
some net tax to discourage overall use. If this is appropri-
ate, then the deposit on batteries might be less than 100
percent fully refunded, even if 100 percent of the batteries
were returned.144
An intriguing profit motive incentive for "collection enterpris-
142 Id. at 43 (discussing in a note to the text that "[tihe proposed deposit-
refund system [for toxic wastes] is analogous to an environmental bond....").
14 Id. at 103. For a discussion of the major uses of cadmium, including its
primary use in the rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery, as well as the benefits
of this battery and possible substitutes for cadmium in these batteries, see id.
at 84-85
144 Id. at 104.
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es" would differentiate a nickel-cadmium battery subsidy arrange-
ment from a traditional deposit-refund subsidy. As ingeniously
explained by authors writing in a recently-published RFF book,
[t]he [nickel-cadmium battery modified] deposit-refund
could work as follows. A product tax on cadmium used
in the manufacture of batteries would serve as the deposit.
Refunds from these tax revenues would be paid out to
collection enterprises, which might include any local govern-
ment or privatefirm, with payment based upon the number
of batteries collected and verification of their appropriate
disposal. The collection enterprises would themselves decide
how to best ensure the return of batteries. They might elect
to compensate retail stores, or other local groups, or municipal
waste collectors for their collection efforts.145
The economic advantage of the aforementioned nickel-
cadmium battery modified deposit-refund idea is that it combines
the incentive-based strengths of the profit motive with the
demand-shifting potency of a pollution tax for those battery
consumers who choose, for one reason or another, not to return
nickel-cadmium batteries. "For the consumer who chooses not to
return batteries, the tax passed on in higher battery prices acts to
reduce use and shift demand toward less toxic substitutes."
146
BFRs consist of organic chemicals added to plastic and textiles
14 Id. (emphasis added).
The profit motive should drive the search for least-cost means of
collection. For example, suppose an incinerator plant finds that it can
mechanically remove batteries from the waste stream at a modest cost.
A collection enterprise may find that buying batteries from these
plants is less costly than trying to encourage customer returns. (The
collection enterprise and the waste plant might be the same entity.)
Curbside pickup programs may similarly be found to be effective
means for collection and, if so, would be supported by the collectionenterprises. A retail store or manufacturer choosing to participate in
the battery collection program would transfer the batteries to the
collection enterprises and be compensated at a negotiated rate. The
store or manufacturer, in turn, might find it effective to encourage
consumer returns by refunding money to customers who return
batteries in the manner of the traditional deposit-refund system.
Id.
146 Id. at 105.
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in the course of manufacture in order to retard flammability. A
unique public policy concern is raised by BFRs: while their use
affords direct safety benefits to the purchasers of certain textile
and plastics products, BFR production and disposal creates
external costs upon non-consuming third parties. This is due to
the environmental risks created at the production and disposal
phases of the BFR life cycle.147  Moreover, four troubling
characteristics of the flame-retardant industry, under existing
command and control regulatory strictures, complicate policy
intervention options: (1) "a large and expanding number of BFR-
related chemicals" allowing plastics and textile manufacturers to
easily substitute another brominated hydrocarbon if one BFR is
legally banned or restricted; (2) scant scientific knowledge of the
chronic toxicities and environmental transport pathways of newer
and infrequently used BFRs; (3) "a considerable range of toxicity
within the group of BFRs;" and (4) high toxicities of functional
BFR substitutes such as recently favored phosphorous-based
compounds.
141
In order to respond to the unique aspects of the BFR products
market, a creative experimental approach advocates a "producer
deposit-refund and performance-bond" strategy.149  As explained
by the authors of this modified subsidy strategy, in language
worthy of extended quotation:
For this case, in which new BFR products may play an
important role, where there is considerable uncertainty as
to product damages, and where these damages may occur
well after the period of production, producer deposit-
refund systems can be valuable tools. Such generalized
deposit-refund systems can move the incentives for
ensuring product safety from the regulator to the producer.
Similarly, these systems can shift much of the burden of
147 Id. at 108 ("Therefore, fire safety codes and other safety measures
promoting the use of BFRs must be balanced with regulation to protect health
and the environment."). "Many brominated organic compouns can be used
as flame retardants .... However, recent concerns over the potential long-term
risks associated with these and other BFRs now in common use have triggered
yet another search for substitutes." Id.
"I' Id. at 108-09.
1'9 Id. at 120.
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proof from the public to the producer in resolving
uncertainty as to damages associated with new products.
The systems may also be designed to avoid some of the
difficulties that can be associated with assessing ex-post
liability for long-term damages linked to persistent chemi-
cals.
Under a producer deposit-refund scheme, manufacturers
of BFRs and related flame retardants would be required to
make deposits based on the anticipated environmental or
health effects of their production. The deposits would be
refunded at some future time, depending on the extent to
which the producer acts to reduce damages or to demon-
strate product safety.
The initial deposit rate would be based on estimates of the
present value of marginal damages expected under unregulat-
ed production. The actual level for this deposit could be
negotiated, with lower deposits called for when a firm
provides convincing evidence of new product safety. Further
deposits would be paid periodically, based on current
production levels, with the rate for new deposits adjusted
to reflect product-safety knowledge gained from continuing
production and use, health studies, and evidence of the
manufacturer's care in controlling emissions. The pool of
deposits would be held in an interest-bearing account.
Deposits would be returned at periodic intervals and could
be based on the meeting of clearly defined conditions as to the
control of releases, results of health studies, and the decay rate
of the product. In a simple approach, the refund would
occur if certain negotiated conditions had been met over
the time interval. For example, a producer might be eligible
for a full refund of the previous year-s deposit if BFR levels
measured in nearby soils and streams had been held below
some agreed-upon level. This approach makes the mecha-
nism for refunds well defined, but the overall success of
such an approach relies upon a good correlation between
meeting the measured criteria and the desired reduction in
third-party damages.
Under a more ambitious approach, the regulator might
attempt to maintain a pool of deposits sufficient to cover
fully future health and environmental damages.... The
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deposit on hand would then cover the present value of the
potential risk from both extant products and potential
emissions as well as from current output. Refunds from
past deposits would be paid back to the extent that the
existing deposit pool exceeded the amount of anticipated
damages. Evidence from health studies and product
experience presented by the producer would provide the
basis for gradual refinement in the estimates of anticipated
product damages.
In some cases, firms might find themselves able to insure
against the loss of deposits. For a premium, an insurance or
bonding company could assume liability for the deposit
and rights to the refunds. The producing firm could then
post a performance bond with the government, guarantee-
ing insurance up to the amount of the required depos-
it .... Of course, an insurance company would take on
such a liability only if it was reasonably sure of the product-s
safety. The insurer would also then assume an interest in
seeing that the manufacturer took all appropriate steps to
limit emissions and ensure product safety. The producer
would find it advantageous to act to ensure product safety
and emissions control, because these steps would reduce
future insurance premiums.' 5'
150 Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Thejprimary advantage of the producer deposit-refund or performance-
bondsystem is that it gives incentives to the producer for ensuring
product safety (not unlike product liability law, but in the case ot
deposit-refund or bonds, the liability link is perhaps more explicit ex
ante). Both the return of current deposits and the level of deposits on
future production are made to depend upon the producer's control
over plant emissions and the demonstrated safety of product use and
disposal. In addition, under these schemes, new products may be
introduced at relatively low costs, especially when tiere is convincing
evidence of safety. Since deposits are based on output levels, deposits
are less of a hurdle to new-product entry than are -high fixed costs of
mandatory product testing. On the other hand, once there proves to
be a potential for large sales, the producers themselves then have
incentives to act to demonstrate ansensure product safety.
Under the producer deposit-refund system, uncertainty as to
damages associated with new products is dealt with by the adaptive
manner in which deposits or premiums are set and by the association
of refunds with measurable performance. The risks associated with
these uncertainties are largely shifted to the producers. Because of
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While deposit-refund schemes are potentially attractive for a
number of toxic substances, production and use of other toxic
substances, such as formaldehyde, would not benefit from these
approaches because of different market and industry variables as
well as different production and consumption characteristics.1 1
Subsidies and analogues of subsidies present exciting possibili-
ties for encouraging responsible private management of trans-
boundary substances risk on the international level. Many subsidy
techniques, like performance bonds, deposit-return laws, and
insurance are already familiar to national and local governments
and businesses. However, the more ambitious strategies discussed
herein have little, if any, empirical track records. The challenge
in deploying subsidies for the purpose of encouraging private
solutions to transboundary toxic substances risk is to find ways to
unleash the power of the profit motive to encourage private
parties to accomplish the public goals of reducing the use of toxic
substances which present significant international risks of harm.
3.1.4. Challenge Regulations
This policy tool is named after its central feature: the
"government challenges a group of sources to take the lead in
designing and implementing a program for meeting environmental
limited information, difficulties in the estimation of damages would
remain, however; thus, periodic administrative reviews would be
necessary to resolve the required level of deposits. Particularly with
long-lived products, it could be hard for firms to establish the absence
of p-otential damages. A less ambitious program that links deposits and
refunds to the meeting of very specific ani measurable criteria would
seem more practical than the alternative in which the deposits are
intended to fully cover estimated damages.
And, finally, the link between the pool of deposits and the actual
liability of damages is also of concern.... A key question, however,
is whether the easy availability of a pool of deposits might encourage
excessive liability judgments in the repair of environmental damages.
Id. at 121-22.
151 See id. at 62-63 tbl.3-5. While not traditionally thought of as a subsidy,
environmental citizen suit statutes, like those passed over the last 25 years in
the United States, are alternative subsidy models. See generally Robert F.
Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REv. 337 (1988) (collecting statutes, cases, and
articles on American citizen suits).
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goals."15 2  Challenge regulation is characterized by four key
features:
" government establishes clear, measurable targets, either
risk-based or technology-based, with a timetable for
implementation;
* the targets are defined for multiple sources, usually at
the industry sector or geographic level, rather than for
individual facilities;
* these sources are given the collective responsibility for
designing and implementing a program for meeting the
targets; and
* government specifies a credible alternative program or
sanction, which will be imposed should progress
toward targets be unsatisfactory.'53
Challenge regulations are fundamentally different from
government-imposed command and control regulation. Challenge
regulations have the potential to entice and stimulate creative,
innovative, and cost-effective experimentation by private industrial
firms. This approach relies upon the private industry's perception
that there are implicit economic, organizational, engineering, and
psychological advantages to achieving environmental improve-
125 ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY TooLs, supra note 109, at 113. For a
discussion explaining challenge regulations and linking them to integrated
permitting and liability, two other incentive-based tools not discussed in detail
in this Article, see id. at 84-85 tbl.3-1.
Since challenge regulations theoretically need to be available as "hammer"
provisions in the event that challenge targets are not met by particular firms,
these coercive or punitive techniques also implicate traditional command and
control regulatory tools. For a discussion of four specific types of comand and
control tools available to governments in the event that internationally-based
challenge regulations were not met, see id, at 84 tbl.3-1.
For a critique of command and control regulation, see supra notes 80 to
101. For a discussion of American common law and statutory pollution
control techniques, see generally Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, supra
note 2. For an interesting comparative law discussion of environmental
statutory commands, see generally Symposium, Statutory Interpretation and
Environmental Law, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 292-689 (1996). For a discussion of
international customary liability, see generally Franz X. Perrez, The Relationship
Between "Permanent Sovereignty"and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary
Environmental Damage, 26 ENVTL. L. 1187 (1996).
153 ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY TooLs, supra note 109, at 115.
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ments in their operations through their own "bottom-up" flexible
plans, rather than the heavy hand of "top-down" inflexible
government micro-mandates. Thus, for the pollution sources, "a
challenge regulation functions like a 'meta-performance standard'
for which a targeted group of sources has the flexibility to choose
whatever means - not only technological, but institutional as well
- they believe would be best for meeting the target." 1 4
Challenge regulations may be fruitfully combined with other
incentive-based policy tools like information reporting"'5 and
technical assistance programs."5 While "[c]hallenge regulation
has not yet been extensively adopted by any country,"17 various
American, European, Canadian, and Japanese environmental
programs, initiated in recent years, use methods similar to
challenge regulations. 5 Indeed, both the United States EPA's
33/50 program (adopted during the Bush Administration) and the
Common Sense Initiative (adopted during President Clinton's first
term) have sought to encourage flexible industry approaches to
pollution prevention and control with special emphasis on
toxics. 59  Moreover, Germany's Green Dot program,"6 and
114 Id. at 115 (citing R.J. Lifset, Take It Back: Extended Producer Responsibili-
ty as a Form of Incentive-Based Environmental Policy, 21 J. RESOURCE MGMT.
& TECH. Dec. 1993, 163-75).
Although the sources may choose to adopt a familiar ap-
proach such as design standards, they may so come up with
innovative or varied approaches, such as a trading program or
a fee system to meet the established targets. If allocation of
responsibility for reductions in emissions or discharges is re-
quired, the sources will have to determine how to make those
allocations themselves. The industry may also decide to use
the challenge to share information, technologies, or personnel
to solve common problems.
Id.
155 See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
157 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TooLs, supra note 109, at 115.
15I See id. at 116.
159 See id. at 115-16. For a comparison between the EPA's 33/50 program
and their Common Sense Initiative and challenge regulations, see id. at 115-16;
compare REDUCING ToxICs, supra note 19, at 79-83, which discusses some of
the policy problems with the EPA's 33/50 Program.
160 See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS, supra note 109, at 116 (discussing
Germany's Green Dot Program).
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the Netherlands' National Environmental Policy Plan 161 exem-
plify challenge regulation policy approaches to toxics and other
residuals.
Using challenge regulations as an incentive-based technique of
inducing private international management of transboundary toxic
substances risk may present some difficult policy problems. First,
since experience with this tool is limited, even at the domestic
level of environmental law within nation-states, private industry
might not necessarily be more adept than government at designing
pollution prevention and control programs. Second, competition
among firms within a particular industrial sector (for example, the
pharmaceutical industry) may occasionally make it difficult to
satisfy all of the firms which have responsibilities to meet
challenge targets. Third, the relevant government oversight
agency would have to design an alternative coercive set of
regulations or sanctions to be deployed should firms fail to meet
relevant targets. 62 Finally, domestic antitrust laws of different
nation-states may impose barriers to international coordination
and cooperation among differently-owned firms within particular
industrial sectors.
3.1.5. Information Reporting
Information reporting is an incentive-based environmental tool
whereby the government "requires firms to provide specified types
of information, either to a government agency or to the public
directly. Required information typically involves activities
affecting environmental quality, such as emissions, product
characteristics, or ambient environmental data."
1 63
Precedents for three categories of information reporting
mandates exist. First, some domestic environmental laws require
industries to report pollution emissions to the government for
purposes of compliance and enforcement!" 4 Second, reporting
mandates "help both government and polluters better understand
161 See id. (discussing the Netherlands' National Environmental Policy
Plan).
162 See id. at 118.
163 Id. at 127.
I" See id. For a general description of the enforcement challenges of the
U.S. EPA in recent years, see JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORcEMENT AT TiE EPA
(1995).
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and respond to problems.""'5 These two categories of informa-
tion reporting mandates provide modest incentives for private
firms to properly monitor and manage their production residuals.
The third category requires public dissemination of information
concerning health risks or environmental threats "posed by a
firm's products or activities," 66 thereby providing a potent
incentive for responsible private management of potentially
harmful substances generated by the enterprise.
The theory behind mandated information reporting is that
accurate disclosure and reporting of pollution externalities will
create public relations opportunities for "clean" corporate
environmental citizens, while generating public relations problems
for "dirty" firms. While,
changes in pollution practices are not made mandatory by
these right-to-know laws, firms face a variety of motiva-
tions to reduce pollution. These include the desire to be
good neighbors and responsible corporate citizens, as well
as fear of adverse publicity or loss of sales. In addition, the
public's heightened awareness of polluting activities due to
information disclosure increases the possibility of regulato-
ry agencies establishing stricter or more comprehensive
regulatory requirements, another incentive for firms to
pursue more proactive pollution reductions.
16 7
"The appropriate form and extent of public information-based
environmental mandates is a contested policy question."
168
Among the potential drawbacks of mandatory environmental
165 ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY TOOLS, supra note 109, at 127.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 127-29.
For example, California's Air Toxics 'Hot Spots' Information and
Assessment Act set up a toxics reporting program that required
facilities to identify potential health risks posedby emissions. The
'Hot Spots' Act was amended five years after implementation. Instead
of simply reporting risks, owners of 'significant risk' facilities are now
require to reduce the risk posed by toxics below the state-determined
level of significance.
Id. at 129.
168 Id.
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disclosure laws are possible misunderstandings by the public of the
meaning and significance of raw environmental data; the increased
burdens and costs on industry of gathering and interpreting
information; confidentiality concerns about sensitive corporate
information and trade secrets; and the questionable relevance of
some mandated information on the effective accomplishment of
specific environmental policies.1 69
On a degree-of-difficulty scale, the environmental policy tool
of information reporting appears theoretically easier to implement
on the international level than other incentive models previously
discussed such as tradeable permits,1 7 pollution or substance
charges,17 1 subsidies,'72  and challenge regulations.'73  While
governments would be spared many of the ambiguities of setting
appropriate artificial markets, or establishing a baseline charge, or
tax, for pollutants, information mandates may still prove to be
quite difficult to properly craft and implement on the internation-
al level. Implementation of an international incentive-based toxics
information program to encourage private management of
transboundary toxic substances risk would include the following:
setting appropriate units of measurement of pollution loads;
establishing common parameters for reporting; interpreting
climatic and geophysical impacts on long-range transboundary
transport of toxic pollutants from various emitting locations on
the globe to various receptor locations; establishing the basis for
expanding the chemical list of toxics to be reported; establishing
the basis and number of regulated industries subject to mandatory
reporting laws; and resolving the issue whether or not peak
emissions data should also be required.
3.1.6. Technical Assistance
Technical assistance, "help [to] targeted entities [to] prevent or
reduce pollution,"14 is a common incentive-based environmental
169 See id. at 129-31; see also Robert F. Blomquist, The Logic and Limits of
Public Information Mandates Under Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy
Analysis, 14 VT. L. REv. 559 (1990).
170 See supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
174 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TooLs, supra note 109, at 85 tbl.3-1.
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policy tool that is often combined with other policy tools.
"These programs educate sources that might not be fully aware of
the environmental consequences of their actions or of techniques
or equipment to reduce those consequences."17 5 The incentive-
based concept behind government technical assistance programs is
that private firms, being equipped with better information,
training, and insight, will make better choices in dealing with the
environmental impacts of their operations.17 6
Technical assistance may take many forms, including
manuals and guidance, training programs and materials,
information clearinghouses, facility evaluations, and
technology R&D. The latter may be conducted in house
or through grants or loans to regulated entities or universi-
ties. Many functions of [existing] environmental agencies
can be called technical assistance. ... Most technical
assistance services are provided at no cost to the user. Yet
sometimes technical assistance is offered in exchange for a
prior agreement from the facility to implement any
recommendations. For example, in the federal Green
Lights program, EPA performs an onsite [sic] evaluation to
identify ways in which a facility could reduce energy
consumption, in exchange for a promise from the facility
to install recommended equipment.17
The policy tool of environmental technical assistance on the
international level, aiming to provide incentives for private firms
to manage transboundary toxic substances risk more responsibly,
seems promising. The existing international organizational
structure of the United Nations and various regional, bilateral,
and federal governmental organizations already provide a great
deal of information and technical assistance on a variety of
subjects.1 71 Potential challenges, however, to conceiving and
implementing an effective transboundary toxics technical assistance
program or programs do exist. They include: whether the
175 Id.
176 See id. at 137.
'7 Id. at 138-39.
178 See infra notes 180-214 and accompanying text.
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technical assistance programs can measurably reduce significant
transboundary toxics flows; the potential of other incentive-based
environmental policy tools to significantly enhance the effective-
ness of technical assistance programs; whether environmental
equity and justice values compel balanced international technical
assistance programs to private industrial firms versus private
indigenous citizen groups; whether international toxics reduction
technical assistance programs have a point of reducing cost-
effectiveness beyond which scarce international funds should not
be allocated; and whether national and international governmental
organizations have the institutional capacity to run and manage
technical assistance programs or whether these functions should
be privatized in non-governmental third parties.
179
3.2. Institutional Metaphors
This Article now considers some available institutional
metaphors for encouraging private environmental stewardship of
toxic substances through incentives. Five broad types of existing
institutions which might conceivably assist and coordinate private
solutions to public transboundary risk are briefly reviewed before
concluding with a theoretical synthesis.
3.2.1. Global Intergovernmental Organizations: The
United Nations System
Ever since the 1972 Stockholm, United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment,18 ° the international community has
recognized the importance of international organizations in
playing a "dynamic role [in] the protection and improvement of
the [global] environment."181 Indeed, in Rio de Janeiro, twenty
years after Stockholm, the delegates to the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED"), in
Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, reaffirmed the crucial implementational
role of "international institutional arrangements" in order "to
promote sustainable and environmentally sound development in
179 See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ToOLs, supra note 109, at 14042.
180 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
' INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 55 (quoting
Principle 25 of the Stockholm Declaration); see generally supra note 27
(discussing the Stockholm Declaration).
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all countries."18 2
3.2.1.1. The United Nations Environmental System
It is logical to presume that any initiative to institutionally
encourage more responsible private management of transboundary
toxic substances risk through incentive-based environmental
experimentation would rely, to some extent, upon the existing
United Nations system."8 3 Intergovernmental and inter-institu-
tional arrangements to launch such a project would seemingly
benefit by working within the framework of the United Nations
system. The General Assembly would act as the supreme policy-
making forum and could provide overall guidance to governments,
United Nations organizations, relevant treaty bodies, and private
organizations.
Within the United Nations environmental system proper, a
number of key institutions provide possible "homes" for an
international set of experiments to encourage private management
of transboundary toxic substances risk: (a) the United Nations
Environment Program ("UNEP"), (b) the Commission on
Sustainable Development ("CSD"), (c) the United Nations
Development Program ("UNDP"), and (d) the International Law
Commission ("ILC"). For various reasons, however, these existing
bureaucratic components of the United Nations system provide
less than ideal institutional structures to launch and carry forward
an incentive-based private toxic substances risk project.
The UNEP already has a full agenda of environmental
projects. These include responsibility for "management of
international conventions such as the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Wild Species (CITES) and the Bonn
Convention on Migratory Species,"8 4 as well as coordinating a
far-flung constellation of regional bureaus in places such as New
York, Geneva, Bahrain, Bangkok, and Mexico, and specialized
units for dealing with specific issues (like the Bureau of Industry
in Paris and a coordinating unit for the Caribbean in Kingston,
182 See Agenda 21, supra note 31, 38.1. See also supra notes 31-45
(discussing various additional provisions of Agenda 21).
18 Cf. Agenda 21, supra note 31, 38.2 (discussing the restructuring and
revitalization of the United Nations with regard to implementing Agenda 21).
184 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 59.
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Jamaica).85 Moreover, UNEP has arguably already overextend-
ed its institutional capacity, having "undertaken some thousand
projects during its first fifteen years, most of which do not
directly concern the development of environmental law."186
Importantly, UNEP was unsuccessful in its "attempt to build on
Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, which calls for the
development of international rules concerning the responsibility
of states and indemnification of victims of transfrontier pollu-
tion."187  Nevertheless, one should remember that UNEP has
achieved some important successes. For example, its development
of guidelines for the regulation of transport and disposal of toxic
wastes led to the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dispos-
al. 188
The Commission on Sustainable Development, like the
UNEP, suffers from a bloated agenda and a set of responsibilities
which prevent it from leading a serious incentive-based approach
to encouraging private responsibility for management of trans-
boundary toxic substances risk. 9 Indeed, the CSD seems to be
a largely bureaucratic conduit for issuing reports to the UN
Economical and Social Council and to the General Assembly. 90
A promising feature of CSD's institutional structure, however, is
its specific charge, contained in Agenda 21, to cooperate with non-
governmental organizations.19'
The United Nations Development Program ("UNDP"), like
the UNEP, is expected to play a crucial follow-up role to the Rio
Conference, and to the promotion of the aspirational goals of
Agenda 21. Since UNDP is expected, "[t]hrough its network of
field offices [to] ... foster the United Nations system's collective
185 See id.
186 Id. at 60. "As a whole, the areas of UNEP action can be classified in six
groups... : 1) human establishments; 2) human and environmental health; 3)
terrestrial ecosystems; 4) oceans; 5) environment and development; and 6)
natural disasters." Id.
18 Id. at 62.
188 See id. at 63, 326-28. The drafters of Agenda 21 also expect UNEP to
take a proactive and vigorous role in following up the Rio Earth Summit. See
generally Agenda 21, supra note 31, 38.21.
189 See Agenda 21, supra note 31, 38.13 (discussing the functions of the
Commission on Sustainable Development).
190 See id. 38.13(g).
191 See id. 38.14.
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thrust in support of the implementation of Agenda 21, at the
country, regional, interregional and global levels, drawing on the
expertise of the specialized agencies and other United Nations
organizations and bodies involved in operational activities,"1 92 it
may be a better structural metaphor for implementing an
international private toxic risk management project than either the
UNEP or CSD. However, because the language of Agenda 21
implies that an unrealistic level of additional international
financial support and organizational restructuring is advisable for
the organization,193 the UNDP is probably not an apt prototype
for an international incentive-based private toxics management
project.
Finally, the structure and approach of the International Law
Commission ("ILC"), a thirty-four member group of international
legal and policy experts established by the United Nations General
Assembly "to work for the codification and progressive develop-
ment of international law," 9 ' is probably too cautious, conserva-
tive, and lawyer-dominated to provide an appropriate analogue for
an international institution which would seek to provide private
incentives for better managing risks from transboundary flows of
toxics."9
3.2.1.2. Miscellaneous Ad Hoc International Agencies
in the United Nations System
Various organizations within the United Nations' system deal,
from time to time, with environmental issues.'96  Certain
structural and operational features of these ad hoc international
192 Id. 38.24.
193 See id.
194 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 63.
195 Entering the 1990s, the majority of subjects on the agenda of the
ILC directly involve the development and codification of international
environmental law: state responsibility, the draft code of crimes
against the peace and security of mankind, non-navigable uses of
international water-courses, and international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law.
Id.
196 See generally id. at 64-70 (discussing how the United Nations Education,
Science and Culture Organization ("UNESCO"), Food and Agriculture
Organization ("FAO"), World Health Organization ("WHO"), World
Meteorological Organization ("WMO"), and the World Bank all have dealt with
environmental issues at various times).
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agencies provide inspiration for designing an appropriate interna-
tional vehicle to implement an incentive-based approach to better
private management of transboundary toxic risk. Of particular
relevance is the World Health Organization's ("WHO"'s)
Prevention of Environmental Pollution Unit activities, 97 the
global pollution monitoring activities of the World Meteorological
Organization ("WMO"), 98 and the special regional environmen-
tal lending policy initiatives of the World Bank.199
3.2.2. Global Non-Governmental Organizations
During the last two decades, global non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") have assumed a prominent role in the
advancment of responsible and far-sighted international environ-
mental laws and policies. Indicative of this special status is the
fact that the Rio Convention's Agenda 21 text devotes an entire
segment, Chapter 27, to the topic entitled "Strengthening the Role
of Non-Governmental Organizations: Partners for Sustainable
Development. " "2 ° As expressed, in relevant part, in Chapter 27
of Agenda 21:
27.1 Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in
the shaping and implementation of participatory
democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible
and constructive role they play in society. Formal
and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots
movements, should be recognized as partners in the
implementation of Agenda 21. The nature of the
independent role played by non-governmental
organizations within a society calls for real participa-
tion; therefore, independence is a major attribute of
non-governmental organizations and is the precondi-
tion of real participation.
27.2 One of the major challenges facing the world
community as it seeks to replace unsustainable
development patterns with environmentally sound
197 See id. at 66.
198 See id. at 67.
199 See id. at 70.
200 Agenda 21, supra note 31, at 230.
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and sustainable development is the need to activate
a sense of common purpose on behalf of all sectors
of society. The chances of forging such a sense of
purpose will depend on the willingness of all sectors
to participate in genuine social partnership and
dialogue, while recognizing the independent roles,
responsibilities and special capacities of each.
27.3 Non-governmental organizations, including those
non-profit organizations representing groups ad-
dressed in the present section of Agenda 21, possess
well-established and diverse experience, expertise and
capacity in fields which will be of particular impor-
tance to the implementation and review of environ-
mentally sound and socially responsible sustainable
development, as envisaged throughout Agenda 21.
The community of non-governmental organizations,
therefore, offers a global network that should be
tapped, enabled and strengthened in support of
efforts to achieve these common goals.
27.4 To ensure that the full potential contribution of
non-governmental organizations is realized, the
fullest possible communication and cooperation
between international organizations, national and
local governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions should be promoted in institutions mandated,
and programmes [sic] designed to carry out Agenda
21. Non-governmental organizations will also need
to foster cooperation and communication among
themselves to reinforce their effectiveness as actors
in the implementation of sustainable develop-
ment.201
Two examples of prominent NGOs that could provide models
for a newly-conceived and focused NGO are: (a) the World
Conservation Union (the "Union")2 2 and (b) the Worldwide
201 Id. 27.1-.4 (discussing objectives for NGO's regarding future
implementation of Agenda 21).
202 The World Conservative Union, prior to 1988, was called the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.
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Fund for Nature ("WWF").
"Created in 1948 at the initiative of the French government,
[the Union] has the unique quality of being a non-governmental
organization made up of conservation groups, states and public
law entities."2 3  As of 1990, the Union "was composed of 62
States, 108 public law entities, such as universities and research
institutes, and more than 400 non-governmental organizations,
most of which are national but including at least 30 international
organizations."2 ° Interestingly,
[t]he objectives of the Union are ... to encourage the
preparation of conservation measures, and education about
conservation, and to provide information to members of
[the Union] and different groups which collaborate with
the Union. Among the work assigned the organization is
consultation with governments and different institutions in
regard to conservation, collection and analysis of informa-
tion and its diffusion among members and affiliates,
elaboration of measures of conservation to propose to
governments, provision of technical support in regard to
treaties to be adopted or already concluded in the field,
and encouragement of research into and application of new
techniques relating to conservation.0 5
The Worldwide Fund for Nature, officially created as a private
foundation with headquarters in Switzerland, helps finance
conservation projects throughout the world.26
3.2.3. Regional Organizations
A variety of regional intergovernmental organizations have
become increasingly involved in international environmental
See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 70 n.27.
203 Id. at 70.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See id. at 72 (discussing funds allocated by the Worldwide Fund for
Nature to different environmental projects).
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policy in recent years. 07 European-dominated organizations,
such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
("UNECE"), the Council of Europe, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), the
European Communities, and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), have been unusually active in
environmental issues.208 Moreover, the Organization of Ameri-
can States ("OAS") and the South Pacific Regional Organization
have both made important contributions to advancing conserva-
tion and environmental protection policies in the Americas and
the South Pacific.2°9
Of particular relevance to issues of transboundary pollution
risk prevention are the UNECE's role in "elaborating and
implementing the Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution [in 1979];"211 the UNECE's 1987 promulgation of
"principles concerning cooperation for the protection of trans-
boundary waters against pollution; "211 the Council of Europe's
1980 preparation of a "European Outline Convention on Trans-
frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or
Authorities,... explicitly designat[ing] environmental protection
and mutual assistance in case of accidents among the topics which
may be the object of joint action;"12 and the OECD's declara-
tion of principles "of emerging fundamental norms of internation-
al environmental law including the obligation to inform and
consult, to notify of emergency situations, the principle of
equality of access between residents and nonresidents, nondiscrimi-
nation in the application of [environmental] legislative rules, and
the polluter-pays principle."213
3.2.4. Subregional and Bilateral Organizations
"Bilateral and subregional treaties which are partly or wholly
devoted to environmental protection frequently establish perma-
207 See id. at 73-91 (describing the involvement of several intergovernmental
organizations in international environmental policy).
208 See id. at 73-85.
219 See id. at 85-91.
210 See id. at 75.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 76-77.
213 Id. at 78.
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nent agencies to assure equitable sharing and efficient utilization
of resources."214 An example of a subregional organization of
this nature is the Niger River Commission, initiated in 1964 by
nine riparian nation-states in Africa to effect cooperation concern-
ing the consumption of river basin resources. 215 An example of
a bilateral organization is the International Joint Commission
("IJC"), established between Canada and the United States in 1909
to protect the boundary waters between the two countries.216
The attractiveness of a regional or bilateral approach to the
matter of fashioning an incentive-based approach to encourage
private management of toxic substances risk is that the relatively
smaller scale of the undertaking more likely will be easier to
implement than global or multinational/multi-continental
approaches. Moreover, it is more probable that bordering nations,
or regionally proximate countries, will share environmental and
health interests to prevent and manage common types of toxic
substances.
3.2.5. Federal Political Systems
Countries with constitutional federal political systems, such as
the United States and Germany, theoretically are capable of
formulating and implementing creative, efficient, and responsive
public policies due to the complementary and specialized functions
of the national and state or regional governments. Further,
"environmental federalism" allows each part of a federal republic
to enjoy a minimum level of environmental protection. Despite
parochial local interests, problems of transboundary pollution
between states can also be fairly and effectively dealt with in a
federal system.217  Yet, environmental federalism also creates
many points of friction and conflict between national and state
governments.
Many of the presuppositions regarding the local and national
214 Id. at 91.
215 See id.
216 See id, at 93.
217 See generally, Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and
Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516 (1995); Robert V. Percival, Environ-
mental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV.
1141 (1995).
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interests are currently being reexamined in the United States.218
This system can act as a potential metaphor for international
arrangements to create incentives for better private management
of transboundary toxic substances risk. It is arguable that federal
systems, like the United States, allow a greater flexibility in
meeting baseline environmental quality standards by permitting
the states, in many instances, to use alternative means to achieve
national environmental objectives (for example, the Clean Air
Act). However, this is not necessarily so and varies from statute
to statute.
4. CONCLUSION
Despite the complexity of understanding the nature of toxic
substances and the transsectoral environmental problematique, it is
apparent that there is a need to move beyond traditional tech-
niques of command and control regulation of transboundary toxic
substances risk under international environmental law. Drawing
inspiration and insights from a variety of non-command and
control policy tool models219 and international institutional
metaphors, ' this Article will end by sketching some theoretical
principles which could serve as a foundation for building a theory
of international incentive-based environmental experimentation for
more responsible private management of transboundary toxic
substances risk.
4.1. The Principle of Market Primacy
At the outset, international environmental law policymakers
must insist that, when intergovernmental intervention in the
production, distribution, and consumption of toxic substances is
justified, "government should adopt regulatory tools that most
efficiently ensure that the benefits of the intervention outweigh its
costs." 1 Thus, with command and control regulation as a last
resort or as a backstop mechanism, transboundary "market-based
21 See Percival, supra note 217, at 1182.
219 See supra notes 109-79 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 180-218 and accompanying text.
221 Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the
Regulatory State, 63 U. CI. L. REV. 1463, 1496 (1996).
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programs,"'m such as pollution or substance charges on toxic
substances2 3 and tradeable emission permits,2 4 should be craft-
ed and implemented by international governmental institutions as
a first resort.?
4.2. The Principle of Multiple Ownership
Closely related to the principle of market primacy is the
principle of multiple ownership. Essentially, this principle calls
for a purposeful policy decision by the community of nations to
divide conceptually the transsectoral environmental problematique
of transboundary toxic substances risk into "encompassable pieces"
through the power of a marketplace of assorted incentives."
Maximizing participation through a rich and varied assortment of
market-based incentives would encourage joint-ownership of the
international problem of transboundary toxic substances risk by
a variety of public and private institutions and ad hoc groups of
individuals. 7  Just as stock exchanges, commodities futures
markets, and other trading systems spread responsibility and
interest in the opportunities and challenges of business enterprises
and concomitantly provide a staggering source of capital and
creative ideas to respond to these opportunities and challenges, the
expansion and proliferation of marketplaces providing solutions
to transboundary toxic substances risk would "allow greater
customization in dealing with ... [these international environ-
mental problems], and increase the flexibility to move from
m Id. But see ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES
AND LMRITS OF MARKETS (1997) (arguing that market-based ideas do not always
solve public problems).
I2 See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text; see also Mcgarity, supra
note 220, at 1496 n.155 (explaining the potentcy of market-based solutions such
as pollution charges on firm choice and social behavior).
.. See id. (discussing the tradeable emmission marketable permit approach).
" For a sampling of free market environmental and regulatory writings,
see generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979); Robert W.
Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New
Era From an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1(1991); Richard B. Stewart,
Economics, Environment; and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86
(1986).
226 See Kenneth H. Keller, Unpackaging the Environment, 13 WORLD POL'Y
J. 11, 21 (1996).
227 See id.
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policies based primarily on regulatory approaches to those that
rely more heavily on incentives, education, or technological
ingenuity."'
4.3. The Principle of Strategic Experimentation
The community of nations should not eschew experimentation
in pursuing the principles of market primacy and multiple
ownership. For example, the further elaboration and clarification
of what one author calls "ideas futures"29 may help to amelio-
rate transboundary toxic substances risk for various wastes and
products. Various public or private foundations, think-tanks,
governments, or industry associations also could encourage private
solutions to international transboundary toxic substances risk by
offering various types of prizes (monetary or non-monetary) for
specific accomplishments in this regard.20
4.4. The Principle of Cost-Effective Targeted Incentives of the
Specific Life-Cycle Stages of Toxic Substances
As the authors of the Resources for the Future book on using
economic incentives to regulate toxic substances231 point out,
"[t]argeting [environmental policy tool] intervention to focus on
228 Id.
22' See generally Russ Ray, Ideas Futures: Gambling on Science, 31 FUTURiST
25 (1997) (explaining the concept of "ideas futures").
230 See, e.g., 1 Fourth SONREEL Proceedings, supra note 100, Tab 4, Legal
Implications of ISO 14000 Implementation (discussing a prestigious professional
certification that manufacturers can achieve throughout the world from the
International Organization For Standardization for implementing environmen-
tal management systems that meet world-class standards); ROBERT ZUBRIN,
THE CASE FOR MARS: THE PLAN TO SETTLE THE RED PLANET AND WHY
WE MUST 283 (1996) (discussing the interesting idea, which could be modified
regarding transboundary toxic substance risk reduction, for the U.S. govern-
ment, or other public or private entity, to post a $20 billion award to be given
to the first private organization to successfully land a crew on Mars and return
them to Earth, as wel as several prizes of a few billion dollars each for various
milestone technical accomplishments along the way"); P.N. Grabosky,
Regulation by Reward: On the Use of Incentives as Regulatory Instruments, 17
LAW & POL. 257 (1995) (reviewing the advantages and potential shortcomings
of regulatory incentives, and suggesting principles by which incentive
instruments-material and non-material-can be used as part of an overall
regulatory regime); Keller, supra note 226, at 21-22 (discussing the functional
equivalent of the U.S. Commerce Department's Baldridge Awards, which
recognize excellence in manufacturing quality).
231 See ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 22, at 7-8.
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specific life-cycle stages or end uses [of various toxic substances] is
likely to be desirable. However, such targeting may entail
significant administrative and enforcement costs." z2 2 According-
ly, policy intervention must be carefully weighed by "balancing
of the benefits of a targeted approach against its administrative
costs."
233
4.5. The Principle of Preferring Self-Enforcing Incentive Strategies
Over Government-Enforcing Strategies
If possible, international environmental law policymakers
should structure self-enforcing, incentive-based approaches to
reduce transboundary toxic substances risk. Indeed,
[t]he property of self-enforcement is clearly desirable for all
types of regulation (whether command and control or
incentive-based) and in all circumstances (whether a single-
source, homogenous pollutant or a multiple-source,
multimedia pollutant), but this property is particularly
important in the case of toxic substances, given their
ubiquity and heterogeneity. Opportunities may well
arise-and be easy to exploit-for evading a toxic substance
tax or operating in such a manner as to elude the purchase
of a permit. The large numbers of intermediate producers
may make it easy, for example, to resell untaxed or
nonpermitted quantities ostensibly intended for benign
uses to a producer who uses the substance in a riskier
process or final product. Or, in deposit-refund schemes,
some chemicals may be readily and relatively undetectably
diluted so as to increase refunds.
For these reasons, intervention strategies that might be
self-enforcing, such as deposit-refund schemes modified to
reduce counterfeiting, or taxes or permits that allow cost-
effective monitoring (perhaps making use of the delivery
manifests that are already required to track the distribution
of many chemicals) are [preferable]. Strategies to penalize
violators by increasing the probability that they will be
232 Id. at 7 (emphasis in original omitted).
233 Id. at 8.
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monitored in the future ... might also prove quite
useful. 34
4.6. The Principle of Vigilance in Avoiding Unintentional
Second-Order Policy Consequences
As elucidated in the RFF study, incentive-based policy
intervention "at one stage of the [toxic substance] life cycle
requires caution to ensure that it does not unintentionally increase
exposure at another."235 For example,
[i]n the case of formaldehyde ... product labels and
standards may reduce potential customer exposure to the
'off-gassing' of formaldehyde contained in various house-
hold products. Suppose producers store these products in
warehouse inventories for a longer period, so that when
the products are eventually delivered to retailers, sufficient
off-gassing has already occurred to meet or exceed house-
hold standards. An unintended effect of intervention at
the end-use level would be that the warehousing may
expose warehouse workers to higher levels of off-gassing.
Another example involves incentives to encourage
recycling of chlorinated solvents and cadmium. Although
incentives may reduce harmful exposure (from disposal) to
society in general, emissions during recycling operations
may increase harmful exposure to society. 36
Any international scheme dealing with risk reduction from
transboundary toxic substance use must take this principle into
account.
4.7. The Principle of Corporate Sustainability
The ultimate incentive for manufacturers of toxic substances
world-wide should be the expected payoff from developing a
corporate vision of sustainability. As noted in two recent articles
211Id. at 8-9.
" Id. at 9 (emphasis in original omitted).
236 Id.
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in the Harvard Business Review, businesses need to realize that
those firms that create a vision of sustainability will be ready to
take advantage of the potentially staggering opportunities for
profits and customer allegiance presented by the impending need
for a sustainable global economy. 17
137 See Stuart L. Hart, Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World,
HARv. Bus. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 67, 76; Joan Magretta, Growth Through
Global Sustainability: An Interview With Monsanto's CEO, Robert B. Shapiro,
HARV. BUS. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 79.
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